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CHAPTER ONE 
REGULATING MARKET ENTRY –AN INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the background to the regulation of the telecommunications sector in East 
Africa as well as the justification of the study. 
1.0 Introduction and Background to the Study 
The last decade of the 20th century saw unprecedented changes in the global telecommunications 
industry with the privatisation of a number of state-owned operators, the introduction of market-
based approaches to the supply of telecommunications services as well as the evolution of pro-
competitive and deregulation policies.1 All these changes culminated in the demand for markets to 
open up. Liberalisation has spilled over into international trade putting growing pressure for global 
or regional rules for competition to facilitate market access.2 These changes affected all countries 
including those in the East African region (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In today’s post-
industrial economy, the importance of immediate communications, information management, the 
rise of international travel and global business has caused an explosion in the international trade in 
services.3 Telecommunications plays a vital role in the organisation and operation of the modern 
global economy as it has internationalised markets, reduced transaction costs, expanding 
productivity and directly increasing economic well-being.4
The liberalisation of telecommunications markets was motivated by: increasing evidence that more 
liberalised markets were growing faster and serving customers better; the need to attract private 
sector capital; growth of the internet; growth of mobile and other wireless services; and the 
development of international trade in telecommunication services.5  
The need to control public spending and the seeming inability of state-controlled industries to 
innovate and respond to the needs of the marketplace has prompted a wave of privatisation and 
                                                 
1 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Overview of Telecommunications Regulation, Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2002, p1-1 
2 V. Cable and C. Distler; Global Superhighways: The Future of International Telecommunications Policy, The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, International Economics Programme, p.30 
3 S. Black; Telecommunications Law in the Internet Age: The World Trade Organisation and its Telecom related 
Agreement, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, London, 2002, p.153 
4 J. Haring; Telecommunications: The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics, The Library of Economics and Liberty, 
viewed 28/05/ 2004. 
5 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra Note 1, p1-1 
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introduction of competition.6 This joined with the driving forces of liberalisation, privatisation, 
regional integration and globalisation calls for appropriate regulatory frameworks to manage that 
change.  
Regulation is regarded as part of the traditional role of government in which public officials set 
standards and rules to guide the operation of private business.7 Telecommunications liberalisation 
can be a complicated matter and definitely requires a careful approach and regulation, as market 
forces left on their own are not fully dependable in all circumstances. Choices have to be made 
regarding privatisation of state-owned operators, introduction of competition, opening of markets 
to foreign investment and establishment of pro-competitive regulations.8 Telecommunications 
regulation demands serious consideration as major public policy issues are involved such as; 
provision of public goods and externalities; rules for enlarging market access and the broad issues 
of consumer protection.9  
Privatisation involves the transfer from public to private hands of the ownership of productive 
assets, decision-making powers and the entitlement to residual profit flows-objective being 
maximisation of profit and not social welfare.10 Liberalisation involves the lowering of entry 
barriers to all or part of a market, allowing third parties to compete with established and generally 
monopoly providers of goods and services and currently most countries have a combination of 
liberalised and monopolistic service.11 Despite all these, barriers to market entry still exist some by 
design, others a natural consequence of forces prevailing in the economy. A barrier to entry, a 
structural feature of a market, places a new entrant at a significant disadvantage compared to a 
market incumbent. Forms of barriers include: regulatory barriers such as using individual licensing 
if new licenses are not being issued in certain markets which increases the importance of 
                                                 
6 P. Tarjanne; ‘The Limits of National Sovereignty: Issues for the Governance of International Telecommunications’, 
in pp.37-45, in W. Melody (ed.); Telecom Reform - Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practice, Technical University 
of Denmark, Lyngby 1997. 
7 P. Osei; ‘Regulation in a Flux: The Development of Regulatory Institutions for Public Utilities in Ghana and Jamaica’ 
(mimeo, SALISES, University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Jamaica).  
8 Ibid. 
9 V. Cable and C. Distler; Supra, Note 2, p. 26. 
10 C. Fink, A. Mathoo and R. Rathindran; ’Liberalising Basic Telecommunications:The Asian Experience’, HWWA 
Discussion Paper 163,  HWWA-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg, 2002. 
11 B. Petrazzini; The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries: Privatisation and 
Liberalisation in Comparative Perspective, Westport, London, 1995, p.17. 
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considering the number of licences in the market and the likelihood of new licences being issued 
when assessing the structural barriers to entry in a particular market.12
Monopoly or exclusivity rights are granted and the justification is; to allow governments to 
maximise revenues from sale; to attract private investors and to help countries without regulatory 
capacity to prepare for market entry.13  While some contend that an exclusivity period is necessary 
to encourage investment, the only reasonable explanation is to increase the government’s revenues 
from the sale.14
Telecommunications traditionally is an industry with high upfront costs for infrastructure and low 
variable costs and with the rise of competitive and partially de-regulated markets, investment is 
riskier.15 If entry is costly, then the incumbent may be able to completely deter entry so that the 
outcome is a much more concentrated market structure and in situations of market externalities, 
entry deterrence could also be through the choice of a standard that is incompatible with that of 
potential entrants.16 It is such reasons that the need for regulation arises. Policy-makers worldwide 
have successfully used sector reforms to improve the performance of markets.17
The most critical complementary change for liberalisation of telecommunications is in the 
regulatory framework as regulation of market behaviour can help stimulate a more competitive 
outcome and ensure terms of access to the network for entrants, all necessary for competition.18 For 
a regulator to be very effective, it is important that key regulatory responsibilities fall within its 
mandate.19
                                                 
12 Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, ‘Guidelines on Dominant Position in a Communications 
Market,’ posted at http://www.mcmc.gov.my/mcmc/facts_figures/codes_gl/guidelines/dp/dp.doc viewed on 
25/05/2004. 
13 M. Shirley; ‘The Effects of Regulation and Competition on Telecommunications in Africa’, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 2001. 
14 S. Wallensten; ‘Privatising Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in 
Telecommunications’, AEI- Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, May 2003. 
15 R. Entman; ‘Balancing Policy Options in a Turbulent Telecommunications Market-A Report of the Seventeenth 
Annual Aspen Institute Conference on Telecommunications Policy’ with D. Hatfield, The Current Status of Spectrum 
Management, Washington D.C., 2003 posted at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/AspenInstitute/files/CCLIBRARYFILES/FILENAME/0000000717/Telecom2003.pdf 
viewed on 10/06/2004. 
16 C. Fink, et al; Supra, Note 10 
17 S. Beardsley, I. Beyer von Morgenstern, L. Enriquez and C. Kipping; ‘Telecommunications Sector Reform-A Pre-
requisite for Network Readiness’, McKinsey & Co. Inc, pp 118-136, p.118 posted at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cr/pdf/gitrr2002_ch11.pdf viewed on 25/05/2004. 
18 Ibid. 
19 C. Fink, et al,; Supra, Note 10. 
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With globalisation, foreign investment is common and foreign investors emerge as clear favourites 
for different market segments. Foreign ownership has coincided with significant concessions to the 
incumbent in terms of ease of entry, interconnection and other regulation all aimed at attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI).20 Licensing arrangements are key to the success in attracting 
investment in the sector so the licensing regime should not constitute a barrier to market entry. 
The East African region has also been affected by the current trend of regional integration and the 
need for adjustments in political and legislative approaches to issues so to meet the challenges 
presented by globalisation. The Partner States seek to establish a Customs Union so as to 
strengthen trade among themselves and are to abolish barriers thus creating the most favourable 
environment for the development of regional trade and investment - both FDI and investments 
generated regionally.21 A critical assessment of the EAC countries indicates that the region is 
largely characterised by pervasive poverty demonstrated in low levels of per capita income, human 
development and productivity; un-diversified economic structures dominated by agriculture, 
modest growth rates and a host of other challenges and constraints.22
The sustainability of both high economic growth and efficiency in operations of private and public 
institutions are dependent on the adoption and effective utilisation of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) and the need to have an effective regulatory regime to ensure a 
secure and conducive policy environment.23
1.2 The East African Community 
The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the 
Republics of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, with its headquarters located in Arusha, Tanzania.24. 
The EAC countries cover an area of 1.8 million square kilometres and have a population of 82 
                                                 
20 M. Taka; ‘The Internationalisation of the South African Telecommunications Sector’, 2001 Annual Forum, 
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 10-12 September 2001, posted at http://www.tips.org.za/f2001/taka.pdf 
viewed on 25/05/2004. 
21 Ben Naturinda, Ag. Director, Management Information System Division;  ‘Overview of the Draft Protocol on the 
Establishment of the East African Community Union’, posted at http://www.ugandaexportsonline.com/eac.htm viewed 
on 01/07/2004.
22 East African Community Online Discussion Forum on the Private Sector Development Strategy; ‘Private Sector 
Development Strategy for the EAC-October 2003’, posted at www.eacpsd.org viewed on 25/05/2004. 
23 Government of Uganda, National ICT Policy, July 2002, p.6, posted at 
http://www.undp.or.ug/documents/ictpolicy.pdf viewed on 29/04/2004. 
24 The East African Heads of State signed the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (the Treaty) 
in Arusha on 30th November 1999. 
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million who share a common history, language, culture and infrastructure which are advantages for 
a unique framework of integration.  
Prior to re-launching the EAC in 1999, the three countries had enjoyed a long history of co-
operation under successive regional integration arrangements: the Customs Union between Kenya 
and Uganda in 1917, which the then Tanganyika later joined in 1927; the East African High 
Commission (1948-1961); the East African Common Services Organisation (1961-1967); the East 
African Community (1967-1977), and the East African Co-operation (1993-1999). 
The objectives of the EAC include to: strengthen and consolidate co-operation in the agreed fields 
with a view to bringing about equitable development among the member states and establish an 
internationally competitive single market and investment area in the region.25  
The institutional framework includes a Legislative Assembly, a Court of Justice, the Summit of 
Heads of State, the Council, Committees and a Secretariat. The EAC Secretariat as the main co-
ordinating body seeks to promote a people- centred economic, political, social and cultural 
development on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit for Partner States. 
The EAC operates on the basis of a five-year Development Strategy that contains policy 
guidelines, priority programmes and implementation schedules. The strategy emphasises economic 
co-operation and development with focus on the social dimension. The Heads of State launched the 
first Development Strategy (1997-2000) in April 1997, followed by the second Development 
Strategy (2001-2005), in order to achieve economic and social integration. The new strategy 
emphasised the role of the private sector and civil society unlike the defunct EAC, which centred 
on the joint ownership and management of common services.  
ICT programmes in Africa are moving to the dynamic phase as its role in development is 
recognised. National and regional development agenda have been developed through ICT policies 
and plans, aiming at creating the necessary economic, institutional, social, legal and physical 
environments26 but more is required.  
                                                 
25 East African Community Secretariat; ‘EAC in brief’, posted at http://www.eachq.org/eac-in-brief.htm viewed on 
20/11/2003. 
26 ibid. 
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The role of ICTs in regional integration has gained considerable attention so regional economic 
communities are taking a leading role in consultations and studies such as harmonisation of 
policies, regulatory frameworks, and infrastructure.27  
Inadequate telecommunications reduces efficiency throughout the economy, diminishes the 
effectiveness of investment in priority sectors and development programmes, causes a comparative 
disadvantage in trade and investment and lowers the quality of life.28 The EAC will not be left 
behind and therefore has to develop programmes to harness the benefits of ICT for the people of 
the region. 
The proponents of the EAC seek to develop a common market for telecommunications services and 
each of the institutions established under the EAC have a role to play in the development of such a 
market. There is need for a number of legislative developments to be undertaken at the EAC level, 
as the example of the European Union (EU) illustrates. These developments should be reflected in 
the market performance and regulation. Market entry is a very crucial aspect in the development of 
competition in telecommunications markets. Current legal provisions require all prospective 
market entrants to acquire licences or authorisations to operate-which conditions if not suitably 
designed, deter entry.  
The telecommunications sector in the EAC has performed well, contributing to national revenues, 
providing employment, improving the lives through corporate social responsibility and 
contributing to development. Reports from the EAC Secretariat indicate that there are a number of 
programmes planned and one of the priority areas is the development of a single licensing regime 
for the EAC. 
Currently each Partner State implements divergent sector policies and if this is not addressed, the 
development of a common market will be hindered. An enabling policy and regulatory framework 
is essential to provide the sense of security required for investment. Regulation encourages 
investment by providing fair rules, which allows investors a profit, inspires confidence in the 
                                                 
27 M. Chetty; NEPAD Ministerial Conference on Science and technology for Development, ‘Information and 
Communications Technologies for Africa’s Development’, posted at 
http://www.nepadst.org/publications/docs/doc08_112003e.pdf viewed 21/05/2004. Also see UNECA - 
http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/it_for_development/default.htm  
28 B. Wellenius; ‘Beginnings of Sector Reform in the Developing World’, in B. Wellenuis, P. Stern, T. Nulty and  R. 
Stern (eds.); Restructuring and Managing the Telecommunications Sector, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1989 pp. 
89-98, p.90. 
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stability of the business environment, and supports efficiency, by encouraging competition and 
market-based pricing and requiring efficient pricing where competition alone is inadequate.29  
The EU, with the most developed regulatory regime for a common market in telecommunications 
under a regional integration framework serves as the best example. It best illustrates the need for 
supranational regulation of the sector in light of globalisation- a proposal put forward in this study. 
In 1988 a study found the EU single market a challenge and in the sphere of telecommunications, it 
will offer a new framework of regulation and management, favouring the establishment of high 
capacity networks which will be an essential dynamic element of the productive capacity.30 This 
should be the case for the common market in the EAC. 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Globalisation, WTO agreements and ITU recommendations have forced African regulators to 
restructure and design new communication modes as well as to reorient regulations towards 
competitiveness, capital investment and technological innovation.31 While models have been 
developed at global level, the need for more suitably adjusted regulatory regimes remains. The 
historical roots of today’s regulatory regimes, lie in the social, economic, political and legal 
foundations of their respective states and so, the regulators evolving in the developing countries 
will also reflect their own historical roots from these perspectives.32 This explains the need to 
examine the main issues surrounding telecommunications regulations and necessary reforms at the 
EAC level before identifying suitable options. 
As telecommunications becomes a regional industry in the EAC, there is need for a harmonised 
regulatory regime to ensure that competition is not distorted as the market opens up to foreign and 
cross-border investment. At global level, one of the potentially most serious constraints on the 
development of new communication systems is the lack of governance; systems of rules law and 
                                                 
29 B. Levy and P. Spiller; Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment in telecommunications- A Comparative Analysis 
of Five Country Studies, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1994. 
30 J. Dellors in Telecommunications in Europe (Ungerer and Costello 1988), quoted in K. Button, European 
Telecommunications policy, in European Transport and Communications Networks: Policy Evolution and Change, in 
D. Banister, R. Capello and P. Nijkamp, European Transport and Communication Networks: Policy Evolution and 
Change, John Wiley & Sons, 1995 p.301. 
31 M. Faye; ‘Telematics Policies in the African context’, posted at 
http://www.unesco.org/webworld/build_info/rinaf/docs/telematics_policies_makane_faye.html viewed on 01/07/2004. 
32 International Telecommunications Union; ‘The Need for Regulation’, posted at 
http://www2.itu.or.th/Coe/handbook/3RegGuideNoTC.html viewed on 12/07/2004. 
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dispute settlement which all players can accept as efficient and equitable.33 There is need to find a 
way in which the existing institutions under the EAC arrangement can implement this regime. 
1.4 Justification of the study 
The study sought to provide an in-depth understanding of the critical issues and options 
surrounding telecommunications regulation and reform at the EAC level. It improves on existing 
studies and the body of available literature in several ways: providing an insider’s scholarly 
perspective of the legal issues relating to market entry. In light of many forces, the need to 
harmonise arrangements towards global level agreements such as the WTO Agreements 
considering the dynamic nature of technological developments in the electronic communication 
sector, remains critical. Telecommunications is of great importance to regional economies and the 
development of the common market, which warrants a suitable policy. 
This study aimed at making a contribution to the general hypothesis that the development of an 
adequate legal regime for ICTs generally will enhance their ability to positively affect the 
governance process in East Africa. By easing market entry, it is presumed that access to 
telecommunications services will improve and with the proper regulatory framework in place, 
programmes such as e-Commerce, e- Democracy/Governance and e Learning and their 
consequential benefits can be made publicly available.  
1.5 Objectives of the study  
The overall objective was to examine the regulatory framework concerning market entry within the 
EAC, with a view to proposing a single approach for a common EAC market in 
telecommunications. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
i. To examine the current regulatory framework for licensing market entry into the 
telecommunications sectors of the three countries and any joint activities under the EAC. 
ii. To examine the possibility of a common regulatory regime for market entry into the EAC 
telecommunications sector. 
iii. To propose a way forward. 
                                                 
33 V. Cable and C. Distler; Supra, Note 10, p.45. 
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1.6 Hypothesis  
The lack of a common licensing framework for the EAC telecommunications sector will affect the 
development of a common market and sector performance in light of challenges such as 
globalisation and the need to attract investment. 
1.7 Scope of the study 
The scope of this study was limited to market entry (licensing and authorisation). While there are 
two aspects of licensing in telecommunications namely spectrum licensing and the grant of 
operating licenses, this study focused on the grant of operating licences for telecommunications 
services providers, only addressing regulation through licensing and not pricing. The geographical 
scope of the study is the East African region comprising of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
GATS/WTO obligations were discussed summarily only to the extent of their relevance to the 
study. 
1.8 Synopsis  
Chapter One consists of the introduction and background to the study comprising of a brief history 
of regional integration efforts in East Africa; regulation of the sector in the three countries 
including general facts and figures about the sector including its contribution to the EAC economy 
and prospects of a common market.  
Chapter Two covers a discussion of principles, objectives and procedures of licensing and 
regulation and the role of the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in determining market entry. 
Chapter Three deals with a review of the telecommunications sector in East Africa plus legal, 
policy and institutional framework and joint activities under the ambit of the EAC all concerning 
market entry and licensing in particular.  
Chapter Four includes a comparative analysis of experiences from the EU to determine what EAC 
can learn from the common regulatory framework for market entry.  
Chapter Five consists of a summary of the findings and recommendations on the way forward.  
1.9 Research Methodology 
The researcher applied the problem-solving methodology limitedly: describing the difficulty 
addressed, defining whose and what behaviours constitute the difficulty, specifying the causes of 
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the problematic behaviours before identifying proposed solutions.34 The researcher employed the 
qualitative research method. There was a historical-critical analysis of facts to determine the social 
and political challenges. A lot of emphasis was on secondary resources. The research involved: 
i. Desk review of relevant literature from distinguished research centres worldwide such as 
the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law, Parliament of Uganda Library, a 
variety of Communications Law Centres and Universities, Internet resources and 
parliamentary debates. This literature included legislative and policy documents and 
analyses by various academic scholars from Africa, the United States and Europe.  
ii. Structured and unstructured qualitative interviews with professionals and public and private 
sector practitioners involved in the telecommunications sector in East Africa (NRAs and 
EAC Secretariat) and different parts of the world.  
1.10 Conclusion 
Having highlighted the general aspects and provided a discussion of the background to the issue of 
licensing and market entry to the telecommunications sector in East Africa, it is pertinent to delve 
into a more detailed discussion of market entry and the role of regulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 A. Seidman, R. Seidman and N. Abeysekere; Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change-A Manual for 
Drafters, Kluwer Law International, Boston, 2001 p.176.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
MARKET ENTRY AND THE ROLE OF REGULATION 
This chapter consists of a review of entry into telecommunications services markets and the role of 
regulation with a focus on licensing and the national and international legal regime governing it. 
2.0 Market Entry and the Role of Regulation 
Barrier to entry focuses on the ease that a new supplier can get into the market35 and operate 
effectively.36 More subtle policy-based ‘behind-the-border’ barriers can derive from differences in 
national regulatory systems, licensing of service providers or government procurement practices 
that discriminate against foreign suppliers.37
To promote the required FDI, there is need for regulation. Gaining full benefit from private sector 
participation and liberalisation requires the regulatory environment to be conducive to a well-
functioning competitive market. This can be achieved through legal and regulatory mechanisms 
and recourse to a strong and truly independent regulator capable of enforcing the rules.38
One of the tools for telecommunication regulation is market structure regulation, which includes: 
i. Entry control through licensing of operators and spectrum, 
ii. Exit control to ensure continuity of service-carrier of last resort, 
iii. Control of collaborations among competitors, 
iv. Control of vertical and horizontal integration, 
v. Market boundary definition and limitation (geographic territories, service sectors and type 
of transmission medium), 
vi. Restrictions on the number of licences that may be held by one company. 
vii. Market structure strategies of liberalisation, devolution or consolidation.39 
                                                 
35 In telecommunications, ‘market’ is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is 
produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximising firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only 
present and future producer or seller of these products in that area likely would impose at least a small but significant 
and non-transitory increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant. 
36 Eric Lie; Competition Policy in Telecommunications-Background Paper, International Telecommunications Union 
posted at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/competition/Presentations/BackgroundPaper.pdf viewed 26/05/2004. 
37 M. Brahmbhatt; Measuring Global Economic Integration: A Review of the Literature and Recent Evidence, World 
Bank, November 1998. 
38 C. Kenny, J. Navas-Sabater and C. Qiang; Information and Communication Technologies-Chapter 24. Vol.2-Macro 
Economics and Sectoral Approaches posted at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/chapters/ict/ict0409.pdf 
viewed on 01/12/2003. 
39 E. Noam and A. Singhal; Supra-National Regulation for Supra-National Telecommunications Carriers? SNF Report 
Number 51/96, Bergen, August 1996, p.1. 
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The deregulation of telecommunications has obviously contributed to reducing barriers to entry.40 
Entry regulation directly affects the market structure as free entry can generate too many firms 
within the market.41  Inevitably, liberalisation has spilled over into international trade and there is 
growing pressure for global or regional rules for competition to facilitate market access. The 
characteristics of contestable markets are: relatively easy market entry and exit with low barriers; 
for investors, easily understood rules and ease of investment or dis-investment; consumer choice 
and easy ability to switch between service providers, and transparent, easily understood market 
information relating to price and quality of service.42  One way of cultivating competition is to 
reduce barriers to entry and facilitate investment and dis-investment as investors bring new 
business models. The competitive position of firms is naturally affected by the telecommunications 
regime of the country within which they operate.43  
Time is of essence and the physical or geographical location of a business is dependent on how 
attractive the regime governing investments generally and the telecommunications sector 
specifically is. For investors, an early entry into a new market is profitable because it yields a 
strategic advantage in the market regardless of capital costs.44 Operators are increasingly involved 
in international business and available evidence shows that such companies direct their efforts to 
countries which are closest in terms of psychic distance- a concept which covers physical distance, 
cultural similarities, incorporating language, legal systems and methods of doing business among 
others.45 Regulators have to put in place conditions that encourage competition because for 
investors, a necessary condition for direct investment is the expectation of the investing firm to 
have monopolistic or oligopolistic advantage.46  
                                                 
40 M. Possas and J. Fagundes; ‘Relevant Markets and Conditions of Entry in Telecommunications Services in Brazil: 
Implications for Antitrust and Regulatory Analysis’, posted at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/competition/resources/telecommunication/, viewed on 19/07/2004. 
41 J. Kim; ‘Excess Entry, Entry Regulation and Entrants’ Incentive’, Discussion Paper Series A No. 402, Institute of 
Economic Research, Hitotushbashi University and School of Management and Economics, Handong University, 
January 2001. 
42 P. Tarjanne, Secretary General-International Telecommunications Union;  ‘How would we recognise a competitive 
telecommunications market if we saw one?’  posted at www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/papers/competition/aei_r1.pdf, viewed 
on 14/07/ 2004. 
43 V. Cable and C. Distler; Supra Note 10 p.31. 
44 S. Holden and C. Riis; ‘Entry into a new market- A game of Timing’, International Journal of Industrial 
Organisation, 12 (1994) pp 549-568, p549. 
45 S. Young, J. Hamill, C. Wheeler and J. Davies; International Market Entry and Development-Strategies and 
Management, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Prentice Hall, 1989, p.9. 
46 See S. Lall and P. Streeten; Foreign Investment: Transnationals and Developing Countries, Macmillan Press Ltd, 
London, 1977, p.18. 
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Unless all regulatory barriers to entry and competition are dismantled at the outset, someone must 
decide how many competitors, under what conditions and who are next allowed into the market.47  
Market entry into the telecommunications sector is regulated because of its importance to 
investment decision-making and also given peculiarities such as network requirements and 
interconnection issues aspects, which should not be left to market forces. Left to market forces, 
interconnection would be used by the incumbent to ensure weak competition.48 Critically, the 
danger is that there is no clear end in sight for government regulation, which distorts the market.49  
The regulator’s role is seen to involve maintenance of an environment conducive to the efficient 
supply of services to the public but should not be in excess of what is necessary as stricter 
regulation raises barriers to entry.50 Market forces should be allowed to play a key role though 
market regulation is still required not only where there is monopoly but also partial competition. 
Regulatory intervention is required namely: to authorise or licence new operators; to remove 
barriers to market entry by new operators; to oversee the interconnection of new entrants with 
incumbent operators; and to ensure that competitive markets do not fail to serve high cost areas or 
low income subscribers. 51
Regulatory objectives vary depending on the particular needs and aspirations of a society. However 
generally acceptable objectives, often reflected in policy documentation, have evolved. The most 
widely accepted are to: promote universal access to basic telecommunications services; foster 
competitive markets by licensing new competitors and existing operators so as to attract 
investment; prevent abuses of significant market power (SMP); create a favourable climate to 
promote investment to expand networks; promote public confidence in markets through transparent 
regulatory and licensing processes; protect consumer rights; promote increased connectivity for all 
                                                 
47 P. Smith and B. Wellenius; Strategies for Successful Telecommunications Regulation in Weak Governance 
Environments, World Bank, March 1999. 
48 W. Melody; ‘Interconnection-Cornerstone of Competition’, Chapter 5, Telecom Reform - Principles, Policies and 
Regulatory practice 1997, p.53. 
49 H. Shooshan and P. Temin; ‘Telecommunications in the 20th Century,’ Strategic Policy Research Institute, posted at 
www.spri.com viewed on 26/05/2004. 
50 S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes and A. Shleifer; The Regulation of Entry, June 2001 posted at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/551.pdf viewed on 20/06/2004. 
51 See A. Baudrier; ‘Independent Regulation and Telecommunications Performance in Developing Countries’, 
University of Paris Pantheon-Sorbonne and Autorite de Regulation desTelecommunications, prepared for the Annual 
ISNIE Conference: Institutions and Governance, Berkeley, California, September 13-15 2001. 
 20
users through efficient interconnection arrangements; and optimise use of scarce resources such as 
radio spectrum, numbers and rights of way.52  
To ensure that these objectives are met, in light of current trends, market forces are expected to 
play a major role and ease of market entry is a compulsory requirement in this process. The 
government as custodian of public and national interest has a duty to ensure that operations and 
market developments are not contrary to its policy objectives and to maintain a regulatory role to 
guarantee that the provision of services is in line with national perceptions of the public interest  
With the introduction of competition in the newly privatised markets, regulators provide the 
required balance by mediating and playing a facilitative, adjudicative or determinative role 
depending on the circumstances. The regulator has an important role in controlling competitive 
entry by granting operating licences and the criteria for the licences include: technical, financial 
and management capabilities; and ownership criteria such as limiting foreign ownership. NRAs 
have a duty to implement government policy in an objective and impartial way towards all market 
participants, to boost market confidence; encourage increased foreign and domestic investment and 
promote compliance with international trade obligations.53 Such independence depends on the 
legal, political and institutional structure in place. 
2.1 Licensing and Market Entry 
The removal of barriers to international trade in telecommunications aims at encouraging 
investment, improving competition and global communications.54 A licence is an administrative 
and unilateral grant by a public authority of a right to operate a service, subject to the terms and 
conditions specified in the licence or other regulatory instruments and presents contractual 
obligations of governments, regulators and operators and this is useful in countries where the legal 
and regulatory framework is less developed and therefore perceived as high risk for investment.55 
There are three approaches to authorising telecommunications: individual operator licences; 
general authorisations and no licensing requirements/open entry and these are applied in varying 
degrees depending on prevailing circumstances.  
                                                 
52 E. Lie; Supra, Note 36. 
53 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra, Note 1, p1-6. 
54 See S. Stephenson; ‘Non-Tariff Barriers and the Telecommunications Sector,’ Paper written for Project on ‘Trade, 
Investment and Competition Polices in the Global Economy: The Case of the International Telecommunications 
Regime’, Institute of International Affairs, Rome Conference 18-19 January 2001 posted at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tunit/STAFF_ARTICLE/steph01%20ntbtel.doc viewed on 19/06/2004. 
55 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra, Note 1, p2-9. 
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General authorisations/class licences allow an entity that meets the basic terms and conditions of 
entitlement to provide telecommunications services without the need for an individual licence. The 
authorisation usually involves the definition of eligibility criteria and conditions with prior public 
consultation and all eligible operators are licensed.56 Spectrum licences are issued for the services 
that require an authorisation to use radio frequencies. 
Market entry is much determined by the licensing regime and regulators that impose strict local 
regulatory burdens or more costly requirements than other countries can handicap players in the 
national markets. Similarly, regulators protecting national operators from international regulatory 
disciplines will retard competition, service innovation and possibly economic growth by failing to 
implement the same competitive regimes as neighbouring countries.57 Easier market entry leads to 
increased competition and the consequential benefits. Licensing of competitive operators aims at: 
expanding range of services to un-served markets; increasing sector efficiency through 
competition; decreasing prices, improving range and supply of services; stimulating innovation and 
introducing advanced services and generating revenues.58
Licensing provisions that affect investor confidence are barriers to market entry because they 
prejudice investment decisions. Competition is likely to be the most effective method of promoting 
improvements in the sector.  
Apart from licensing conditions, other laws affecting investment conditions determine market 
entry. 
Given the role of regulation in service provision, licensing is an important regulatory tool. 
Licensing and authorisation are legal impediments to market access. A telecommunications licence 
authorises service provision or network operation and defines the terms, conditions major rights 
and obligations of such authorisation.59  
The licensing process is one of the most important processes undertaken in the course of reforming 
the sector as it determines the structure of markets60, the number and types of operators (entry and 
exit), the degree of competition between them, the revenues earned by governments in opening the 
                                                 
56 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra, Note 1, p2-12. 
57 Ibid p1-22. 
58 ibid. p1-4. 
59 ibid, p2-1. 
60 See S. Verhulst; ‘Introduction to Telecom Reform and Liberalisation: Policy and Regulatory Tools’, Markle 
Foundation, August 2003, posted at http://www.stanhopecentre.org/ict/materials/IntroTelecomReform.ppt viewed on 
16/06/2004. 
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markets and ultimately the efficiency of the supply of services. Licensing determines whether entry 
in different market segments should be limited or open and terms of entry, thus creating market 
forces.61  Licence payments, which are independent of the customer base, constitute an endogenous 
sunk cost of entry, which can deter market entry.62  Space limitations arise if geographical de-
limitations are marked out in the licence. Providing government regulation permits, licensing and 
franchising arrangements are space limited, enabling the regulator to segment the market nationally 
and internationally.63  
In many countries the balance between regulatory certainty and flexibility is achieved using 
regulatory instruments other than licences as the main elements of the regulatory framework but if 
the regime is not well developed then there is need to comprehensively codify the basic regime in 
the licence so as to provide the certainty required to attract new entrants and substantial investment 
to the sector.64 Such licences should define exclusivity rights but this should not limit sector 
growth, reduce operator efficiency and competition. 
Licensing is a relatively new development in many telecommunications markets, as in the past, 
with monopoly operators had a mandate stipulated in the law and therefore there was no need for 
licences. 
2.2 WTO Obligations affecting Licensing 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications (ABT) include trade rules applicable to telecommunications regulation and 
licensing and which members must comply with. WTO agreement was aimed at creating a 
competitive global telecommunications market. GATS sought to create a credible and reliable 
system of international trade rules to ensure among others fair and equitable treatment of all 
participants. The Fourth Protocol to GATS sought to liberalise trade in basic telecommunications 
services and taken with the dispute resolution mechanisms available through the WTO, creates an 
embryonic world regulatory system at the global level.65 The basic GATS principles of Most 
                                                 
61 P. Smith, ‘What the Transformation of Telecommunications Markets means for Regulation’, Note No. 121, Public 
Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, Washington D.C., July 1997. 
62 P. Bijl & M. Pietz; Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications Markets, Cambridge University Press, London 
p.27. 
63 S. Young, J. Hamill, C. Wheeler and J. Davies; Supra, Note 45.p.25.   
64M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra Note 1, p2-18. 
65 P. Strivens and R. Bratby; ‘International Regulatory Framework’, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, J. Scherer 
(ed.) 4th edn. Butterworths, London, 1998.p.449.  
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Favoured Nation treatment, market access and national treatment are to apply to the sector. With 
regard to market access, each member undertook not to continue to use or create quantitative 
restrictions on market access by foreign suppliers, save for restrictions that are expressly listed in 
that member’s Schedule of Specific Commitments.66 Licensing is one of the identified mechanisms 
of a liberalised telecommunication regulatory environment.67 The WTO has been given some 
uncontrolled regulatory powers in the area of basic telecommunications.68 The number of service 
suppliers allowed and foreign equity participation or investments is the most crucial for the 
opening of telecommunications markets where restrictions to entry essentially come from exclusive 
rights or limitative licensing policies and investment restrictions.69
2.3 Conclusion 
The role that regulation plays in determining market entry has been highlighted since the licensing 
process affects the number of players allowed into the market. WTO sector specific obligations 
have to be taken into consideration before allowing entry. Having dealt with these key issues, it is 
significant that the next chapter delves even deeper into the regulation of the sector in East Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 The restrictions to market access that are listed are on: the number of service suppliers; the value of service 
transactions or assets; the quantity of service operations or service output; the number of employees employed in a 
particular service sector; and on the types of legal entity through which a service may be supplied and on foreign 
investment.  
67 The WTO Reference Paper 1996 makes reference to public availability of licensing criteria. 
68 C. Von Engel; ‘European Telecommunications Law: Unaffected by Globalisation?’ Max-Planck Project group, 
posted at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=311981 viewed 21/07/2004. See Annex III for the relevant WTO rules relating to 
telecommunications. 
69 M. Bronckers and P. Larouche; ‘Telecommunications Services and the WTO’, Journal of World Trade, p. 15.  For 
historical developments on the same see C. Primo Braga, ‘Liberalising Telecommunications and the Role of the WTO’, 
World Bank, Private Sector Note No. 120, Washington, D.C., July 1997. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REGULATING MARKET ENTRY IN EAST AFRICA 
This chapter concerns examination of the historical development of the telecommunications sector 
in East Africa right through to the current developments under the revamped EAC. 
3.0 Historical Background  
The regulation and administration of the sector in East Africa dates back to the pre-independence 
days when Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (then Tanganyika and Zanzibar) were under British 
colonial administration.70 When the British established firm administration over Kenya and 
Uganda, they recognised the advantages of jointly administering certain services within the 
region.71 Communications and other infrastructural services were under common administration for 
ease of governance, which provided the background for the joint administration of these services 
later on. Economic integration in East Africa developed without the benefit of theory having been a 
pragmatic response to administrative and commercial needs72 and was through different 
arrangements under several legal instruments.73
The common approach for telecommunications developed as follows: 
i. The amalgamation of the Posts and Telegraphs Departments of Kenya and Uganda in the 
1920s and in 1933, with that of Tanganyika providing an East African administration for both 
postal and telecommunications services which were financially dependent on the territorial 
governments.  
ii. The establishment of a self-contained, self-financing organisation, the East African High 
Commission (EAHC), in 1949 to provide for the control and administration of matters and 
services of common interest with the East African Central Legislative to pass legislation on a 
wide range of subjects, including inter-territorial communications.74 The EAHC consisted of 
the governors of the three territories.75  Emphasis was on the management of common 
services and matters of common interest. 
                                                 
70 After World War I, Tanganyika was made a Mandate territory under the League of Nations and put under the charge 
of Britain and this automatically placed it under the arrangements previously made for Kenya and Uganda. 
71 G. Kanyeihamba; Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi 1975. 
p.350. 
72 A. Hazlewood; Economic Integration: The East African Experience, Heinemann, London, 1975 p.10. 
73 East Africa (High Commission) Orders in Council (1947 to 1961), East African Common Services Organisation 
Agreements (1961 to 1966) and the Treaty of the East African Community (1967 to 1977). 
74 E. Bakibinga; The Legal and Institutional Framework for Achieving Regional Co-operation: A Study of the East 
African Legislative Assembly, Unpublished LL.M Thesis,  Makerere University, Uganda, 2003. 
75 East Africa (High Commission) Orders in Council Section 4(1). 
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iii. The establishment of a common services organisation in 1961 on recommendation of the 
Raisman Commission that it was in the best interest of all the territories that the common 
services continue to be provided on regional basis.76 The East African Common Services 
Organisation (EACSO) undertook the administration of the common services; the 
responsibility for policy rested with the Authority consisting of the principal elected ministers 
of the three territorial governments and later to the three Heads of State.77 The EACSO was 
controlled by triumvirates of Ministers (Communications triumvirate consisted of Ministers 
for communications).78 The EACSO was found to be structurally weak and this led to some of 
the stresses and strains that developed between EACSO members after 1961.79 At 
independence, transport and communications infrastructure were administered at the regional 
level.80  
iv. The establishment of the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (EAPTC) 
with headquarters in Kampala, Uganda on recommendation of the Philip Commission in 
1966. The East African Ministers responsible for Communications replaced the triumvirate.81 
A Communications Council, responsible for controlling the EAPTC, was established and 
provided a consultative forum on communications. 
EAC, plagued with many problems (ranging from ideological differences, lack of strong political 
will by the heads of state, lack of adequate institutional support, national problems, lack of strong 
participation of the private sector and civil society, the continued disproportionate sharing of the 
benefits, lack of adequate policies, breakdown of the rule of law, to lack of harmonisation of 
policies and law)82 collapsed in 1977. The Partner States incorporated national corporations to fill 
the vacuum created when EAPTC ceased to exist. The colonial powers left inadequate 
telecommunications hardware, infrastructure and an obsolete organisational structure which was 
                                                 
76 A. Hazlewood; Supra, Note 72, pp 27-36. 
77 See Colonial Office, The Future of East Africa High Commission Services, Report of the London Discussions, June 
1961, Cmnd 1433, London, HMSO, 1961. 
78  A. Hazlewood; Supra, Note 72 p. 36. 
79  See A. Hazlewood; Supra Note p. 37. 
80S.K. B. Asante & D. Chanaiwa, 'Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration' in M. Mazrui & C. Wondji (eds.) , 
General History of Africa VIII- Africa since 1935, (Oxford, UNESCO,1999) pp 724-743 at p.730. 
81 A. Hazlewood; Supra, Note 72 p. 85. 
82 The Preamble to The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community signed in Arusha, Tanzania on 
November, 30th 1999( hereinafter referred to as the EAC Treaty)  p.1 Paragraph 4. 
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ineffective in meeting the demands of an information-based economy and high technology 
industries83 which structures, the corporations inherited. 
The rapid spread of regionalism is one of the most important recent developments in the global 
trade system that resulted in the revival of the EAC. There is a lot to learn from the experience of 
EACSO though its relevance is limited by the fact that there was no private sector ownership in the 
provision of telecommunication services then. 
3.1 Current Developments and Sector Analysis 
The current status of the EAC telecommunications sector reveals a dynamic increase in investment 
and utilisation of ICT in the region.84 There has been a steady growth in the number of mobile and 
fixed line usage over the years as tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Annex VI1 illustrate. These developments 
are due to regulatory changes in response to globalisation and demands from international 
organisations. Spurred by changes in technology, the abysmal performance of incumbent providers 
and prodding by international organisations, developing countries are privatising state-owned 
telecommunications providers, opening up portions of their markets to competition and building 
regulatory institutions.85  
To make the case for a common licensing regime, requires analysis of the relevant regulatory set 
up in each Partner State- examining: the effectiveness of the regulator; powers and mandate; terms 
and conditions; enforcement; exclusivity periods; fees; the judicial review process and 
interconnection issues at regional level. This analysis focuses on the capacity of key players in 
regulating market entry; the legal and policy regime within which they operate; human and other 
resources available and other issues relevant to the process. 
3.1.1 General Overview and Sector Performance 
Kenya 
The sector was liberalised to attract private capital and increase efficiency by allowing competition 
in crucial areas, which would be fostered with the licensing of new players thereby increasing 
consumer choice and accelerating investment.86 By clearly outlining the market structure, the 
                                                 
83 E. Noam; Telecommunications in Africa, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p.3. 
84 See indicators in the Tables 1 and 2, Annex VII. Table 5 Annex VII shows the chronology of reforms. 
85 S. Wallesten; An Empirical Analysis of Competition, Privatization and Regulation in Africa and Latin America, 
World Bank,  Washington D.C., May 1999, p.1. 
86 Communications Commission of Kenya; ‘Telecommunications Sector Policy’, posted at 
http://www.cck.go.ke/policy/Structure.pdf viewed on 23/06/2004. 
 27
licensing requirements and procedures would result in an environment where there is a significant 
level of regulatory certainty in the market, an attribute desired by investors and consumers alike.87
The enactment of the Kenya Communications Act (KCA) in 1998 led to the split of Kenya Posts & 
Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC) into three separate legal entities including; Telkom 
Kenya Ltd (telephone services) and the CCK (regulatory authority).  
The KCA provides for the establishment of a National Communications Secretariat (NCS) to serve 
as government policy advisory arm on all issues pertaining to the info-communications sector and 
the functions include formulation of policies and recommendations.88
Telkom Kenya Ltd. was licensed as sole provider for fixed local, national long distance and 
international telecommunications services.89 In 1999 a second GSM cellular licence was 
successfully auctioned and eight regional telephone-operating licences were sold to 3 Kenyan 
firms.90 The sale was delayed in 2000 after the highest bidder failed to pay up the $ 305 million 
purchase price, forcing revival of the bidding process.91  
Safaricom, a subsidiary of Telkom, and Kencell Communications Limited operate national cellular 
mobile telecommunications services and CCK is in the process of licensing a Second National 
Operator (SNO) and plans to licence another mobile telephone provider.  
In 2001 CCK reviewed and segmented the market into various service streams that are licensed 
separately. The market is structured as follows with: full competition in leased lines, data, paging 
and ISP; partial competition in local services, mobile analogue, mobile satellite and GMPCS and 
monopoly in domestic long distance, international long distance, VSAT and Fixed Satellite.  
The cellular market segment recorded high growth rates of 23% per year from 1999 however; 
Kenya has not been able to achieve all policy goals.92 The sector was described in 2001 as 
                                                 
87 Communications Commission of Kenya, ‘Telecommunications Market Structures and the Licensing Procedures- The 
New Telecommunications Market Structure, December 2001’, posted at http://www.cck.go.ke/policy/Structure.pdf  
viewed on 23/06/2004. 
88 Section 84 KCA. 
89 Plans are in place to privatise the incumbent by sale of 49% of equity to a strategic investor and CCK invited bids for 
the sale. 
90 Safitel, Telair Communications Ltd and Bell Western. 
91 C. Ryan;  ‘Africa reluctantly begins to liberalise Telecoms’, posted at 
http://www.centerdigitalgov.com/international/story viewed on 21/06/2004. 
92 M. Mureithi; Kenya Telecommunications Sector Performance Review 1999-2003, Summit Strategies Ltd, Nairobi, 
2003 posted at http://www.researchictafrica.net/images/upload/Kenya%2013_04_04%20MM%20v2.pdf viewed on 
26/06/2004. 
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suffering from under-investment, political interference and unreliability.93 The mobile operators 
have exceeded the rollout targets in the licences. The fixed operator however has not been able to 
meet set targets so the regulator had to impose fines. 
Tanzania  
Telecommunications sector reform was launched in 1993 and since 1995 a comprehensive 
privatisation programme has been in force permitting foreign investment and participation.94  
The Government’s mission is to develop a stable regulatory environment to facilitate and attract 
investors in the sector. The government intends to license a SNO (fixed line) by February 2005.95
The liberalisation schedule was: mobile-1995, local-2005; national and long distance-2005. Local 
services, domestic long distance, international long distance, wireless local loop and leased lines 
are still monopolies. There is full competition in mobile, private VSAT licences, terminal 
equipment trade, cyber cafés, telecentres, Data and ISP. Payphone services are not yet liberalised 
and public Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is not allowed.  
The main operator is Tanzania Telecommunication Company Ltd (TTCL) [70% market share 
now]96, which operates fixed line basic telephony services enjoying a monopoly on mainland 
Tanzania, and a duopoly on Zanzibar. The TCRA has licensed: 2 basic telecommunications 
operators with TTCL throughout Tanzania and Zantel for Zanzibar (regional licence) using GSM 
fixed wireless97; 5 land mobile cellular telephone operators; 8 public data network operators; 22 
ISPs registered and 4 closed group data communications licences.98
There is considerable foreign investor participation in the sector. Vodacom Tanzania was granted 
an operational licence in December 1999.99 Detecon/MSI100 Consortium hold 35% shareholding of 
                                                 
93 D. Kimutai; ‘Information Technology Landscape in Kenya: Telecommunications Infrastructure and Regulation’, 
posted at  http://www.american.edu/initeb/dk1540a/Telecommunication%20Infrastructure%20and%20Regulation.htm  
viewed on 14/07/2004. 
94 US Government; Foreign Trade Barriers-Tanzania, posted at  http://www.ustr.gov viewed on 24/06/2004. 
95 According to Acting Director of TCRA, Abihudi Nalingigwa, plans for the SNO licence were to be issued by July 
2004 and government to sell part of its 65% in TTCL to private investors, quoted in ‘Tanzania: Second Fixed Line 
operator in the works’, posted at http://www.regulateonline.org/intelecon/2004/May/Tanzania viewed on 14/07/2004. 
96 Section 12 vested in the TCRA the power to designate a telecommunications successor company to be a public 
telecommunications licensee to perform all or any of the functions relating to the operation and provision of 
telecommunications systems and services in Tanzania. 
97 African Connection Centre for Strategic Planning; Tanzania Rural ICT Market Opportunity, Final Report-October 
2002 posted at www.infodev.org/projects/telecommunications/35/africa viewed on 27/06/2004.   
98 UNDP and Markle Foundation; Creating a Development Dynamic-Final Report of the Digital Opportunity Initiative- 
Appendix 3 National ICT Approaches: Selected Case Studies -Tanzania posted at http://www.opt-
init.org/framework/pages/appendix3case7 viewed on 24/06/2004. 
99 Caspian Construction and Planetal Consortium Tanzanian based-investors own 35% of the shares and Vodacom 
Group 65%Vodacom Group's shareholders include Telkom SA Ltd (50%), VenFin Ltd (15%) and Vodafone Group plc 
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TTCL with a four-year exclusivity period for fixed lines with an obligation to expand the fixed line 
network from 162,000 lines to 800,100 and pay USD 120 million for the concession to boost 
capital for expansion. The mobile operators in Tanzania, have met their targets easily but not the 
fixed operator. 
Uganda 
The Uganda Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (UPTC) under the auspices of the sectoral 
ministry, was established to provide telecommunications and radio communications services; to 
regulate telecommunications sector and grant licences to other operators.101  In 1994, Celtel was 
granted a licence for mobile cellular operations with the expectation of rapid sector 
development.102 However by 1995, Celtel was still having problems raising funds, was cream-
skimming the market and had not expanded significantly.103
The government implemented sector reforms given that telecommunication availability has a direct 
bearing on economic development.104 Previously the sector had been run down as a consequence of 
the country’s political and economic difficulties.105
The reforms included separating the UPTC into different entities. Uganda Communications 
Commission (UCC) was established to independently regulate the industry and tender policy 
advice. In the absence of an appropriate legal regime, a comprehensive licensing process was 
adopted. A ‘pre-package regulatory rules’ approach where a moderately pro-competitive policy 
coupled with specification of initial rules into the licences of the main operating companies added 
up to a fairly robust regulatory framework.106 Prices for most services were substantially re-
balanced and liberalised prior to the award of the SNO licence, thereby increasing investment.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
(35%) Vodacom, ‘Introduction’, posted at http://www.vodacom.co.za/about/corporate_profile/introduction.asp viewed 
on 30/June/ 2004. 
100 It is a German and Dutch Consortium. 
101 Uganda Posts and Telecommunications Corporation Act 3/ 1983,  Cap 107 Laws of Uganda. 
102 Celtel Uganda with an investment of US $ 35 million is backed by Mobile Systems International Cellular 
Investments (MSI) which owns 89.5 per cent shareholding and 10.5 per cent owned by the International Finance 
Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank. See ‘Uganda Transport and Communication Profile’, posted at  
http://www.ugandainvest.com/transport.pdf viewed on 24/06/2004. 
103 C. Mutalya; ‘Status of the Telecommunications Sector in Uganda’, Regional Workshop on the SISEL Program 22-
26 September 2003, posted at http://egov.unitar.org/spip/IMG/ppt/uganda-telecom.ppt  viewed on 14/07/2004.  
104 See Annex IV for details of Uganda’s sector policy. 
105 B. Wellenius, P. Stern. R. Nulty and R. Stern; Restructuring and Managing the Telecommunications Sector, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., 1989. 
106 P. Smith and B. Wellenius; Strategies for Successful Telecommunications Regulation in weak Governance 
Environments, World Bank, Washington D.C. 1999. 
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Uganda’s approach was to introduce immediately some competition in all services by authorising a 
SNO to provide local, cellular, domestic long distance and international telephone services both 
supplementing and competing with Uganda Telecoms Ltd. (UTL) the incumbent fixed line 
operator. Amendment to the Uganda Communications Act (UCA) separated licensing of SNO from 
the privatisation process to enable faster action on the licensing of the SNO and the winning bidder 
was the MTN/Telia Consortium.107 UTL got its licence upon incorporation as a successor 
company.108
Before the bidding process, licences were prepared for both UTL and MTN109 and this was aimed 
at providing certainty for all parties involved and the issues covered included network roll-out, 
price control, interconnection, monopolistic prices and resale.110
The number of telephone lines, including cellular increased by more than 35% in the year after the 
SNO licence was awarded and by 1999, Uganda had more mobile subscribers than fixed line 
subscribers.111 Uganda’s teledensity has increased from 0.27% to 0.87%.112  
Detecon/MSI won the bid for 51% stake in UTL, Telkom SA having pulled out of the race on the 
grounds that the operating terms and conditions stipulated were not considered sufficiently flexible 
in terms of its investment objectives.113
Foreign investor participation has been high and one of the emerging issues is that local 
participation in ownership of licensed telecommunications service providers is low.114  
The Ugandan market has grown dynamically since 1996 when sector reform was initiated.115 The 
transport and communications sector has increased its contribution to GDP from 5.9% in 
                                                 
107 It comprised of MTN South Africa, Telia Overseas AB, Tristar and Investco based in Uganda and Rwanda 
respectively with an initial investment programme of US$ 75 million. MTN in a bid to ensure network quality 
introduced the first 1800 MHz network in Africa culminating in quality services and being voted Investor of the Year 
2000 by the UIA and named Leading Telecommunications Communications Company in East Africa in 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Most Respected Company survey.  
108 Section 83 UCA 
109 Both UTL and MTN are licensed to make available a range of communications services including international 
voice telephony services. 
110 The SNO licence document contained a detailed default interconnection agreement to be imposed by UCC if 
negotiation of interconnection arrangements is not successful. 
111 C. Fink et al; Supra, Note 10. Uganda was the first country in Africa (and third in the world after Finland and 
Cambodia) to have its mobile subscribers exceed the fixed line. 
112 Of the 330,000 mobile phone subscribers, MTN has 200000, UTL has 85000 and Celtel has 45000. 
113 A. Singleton, Executive for Corporate Communications quoted in S. Bridge; ‘Telecommunications: Telkom seeks 
new lines after Uganda’,  posted in www.btimes.co.za/98/0726/comp/comp9  viewed on 24/06/2004.  
114 Government of Uganda, National ICT Policy. Supra, Note 104. 
115 There is a significant improvement of service delivery, tariffs have dropped by 70% and connection costs have 
fallen also see Uganda Communications Commission; ‘Request for Applications to Pre-qualify to provide Universal 
Access Telecommunications Services’ Kampala March 2004, posted at  www.ucc.co.ug viewed on 21/06/2004.    
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2002/2003 to 6.3% in 2003/2004 especially due to new investments in telecommunications.116 The 
licensed operators in Uganda easily met most of their rollout obligations though some failed to 
meet sub-county presence and were relieved of their protection there. Mobile operators exceeded 
their targets and have been allowed to convert the extra lines into equivalent fixed ones which 
targets are pending. 
3.1.2 Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Licensing 
3.1.2.1 Mandate over Market Entry and Regulatory Effectiveness 
All the NRAs regulate market entry through the issuance of licences and determine the number of 
market players. The NRAs licence and regulate telecommunications services using the law that sets 
out the rights and obligations of licensees for service provision,117 the Regulations118 and licensing 
agreements with operators. NRAs ensure the maintenance and protection of effective competition 
and encourage private investment. CCK has the mandate to enable persons providing services to 
compete effectively in markets outside Kenya.119  NRAs can use any regulatory tool to ensure 
competition in the sector. Persons seeking to operate telecommunications services apply for 
licences.120 Uniquely, in Kenya, the renewal process is licence-specific so it varies according to the 
terms the parties can negotiate for, which reduces certainty and predictability.  
The appointment process differs with CCK and TCRA121 board members being presidential 
appointees while for UCC, the board members are ministerial appointees but with Cabinet (chaired 
by the President) approval. Presidential appointments indicate sanction by and approval of the 
highest executive office, which is good but limitations of such appointments apply. In Tanzania, 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the board are appointed on the basis of place of origin 
(mainland Tanzania or Zanzibar). The President can remove the Board members from office after 
consultation with the relevant sector minister on stipulated grounds.122
                                                 
116 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Background to the Budget, 
July 2004, posted at www.finance.og.ug viewed on 22/06/2004. 
117 Kenya Communications Act, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, Tanzania Communications 
Commission Act and Uganda Communications Act. 
118 Kenya Communication Regulations 2001, Tanzania Licensing Guidelines, Uganda Licensing Regulations (Draft of 
2004). 
119 Section 23(e) KCA. 
120 Sections 24 & 25 KCA, Regulations 9, 13 & 31 Kenya Communications Regulations 2001; Sections 25 & 27 
Uganda Communications Act. 
121 Section 12 TCRA Act. 
122 Section 12. 
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In Kenya and Tanzania123, the NRAs issue all licences for basic fixed telecommunications services 
and land mobile cellular services and not by the Minister, which presupposes less interference from 
politicians. TCRA cannot award or cancel a licence with exclusivity periods or universal service 
obligation or with a term of 5 years or more without prior consultation with the Minister and the 
relevant sector.  
Uganda has different categories of licences: national operator’s licence and mobile cellular licence. 
UCC grants minor licences and only advises the Minister on the grant of major licences.124 The 
Minister’s approval must be obtained for any action to be taken on major licences. UCC is required 
to prescribe the terms and conditions of all operators including major licences. Whether the 
Minister’s involvement does not introduce unnecessary political influence is debatable and the 
measures to safeguard against this remain to be seen. Since the terms and conditions are 
determined by UCC, ministerial involvement may be a hindrance. Probably, major licences are 
granted by the Minister to provide the certainty of political blessing that most investors desire 
before committing resources. The lack of an independent NRA resulted in the Minister issuing 
major licences for the duopoly yet that of UTL was issued by UCC.125 UCC approves the terms of 
interconnection agreements and upon failure of the parties to agree, can impose an interconnection 
agreement.126 Modification has to be based on guiding principles127 and decisions to renew, 
suspend and revoke, transfer, or subcontract by licensee require consultations with the operator 
subject to appeal to the Tribunal.  
While making decisions, the NRAs are required to take into account whether the conditions for 
effective competition exist in the market and to ensure that unless justified, competition is not 
reduced.128
The Minister gives policy direction129 to the NRA. In Kenya, the NCS conducts policy analysis and 
the Communications department of the sectoral ministry in Uganda has responsibility to evaluate 
                                                 
123 Section 4 TCRA Act 12/2003 and Licensing Guidelines. 
124 Draft Licensing Regulations. 
125 Interview with officials in UCC Licensing Department, 30/09/2004. 
126 Section 63 UCA. Also see Note 41 on MTN default interconnection agreement. 
127 Stipulated in Section 36 UCA. 
128 sections 19 TCRA and 5(2) TCC Act. 
129 Sections 6(4) TCRA Act and 6(1)a-7 TCC Act. and Section 11 UCA. 
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the current policies and modify them according to international trends130 though the Minister issues 
guidelines and policy after consultation with UCC.131  
Ministerial involvement in the appointment, determination of terms and remuneration and issuance 
of licences can culminate in political interference in licence-decision making process and a 
violation of the policy requirement for the separation of roles. 
3.1.2.2 Licensing Process  
Licensing guidelines have been developed in each Partner State and these streamline the licensing 
procedures.132 In Kenya and Tanzania133, the licensing procedure involves a 60-day notice given 
before a licence is granted while Uganda does not have a time limit. TCRA is required to inform 
the applicant within 28 days of the registration of the application. 
The 60 days-limit is set to ensure timeliness in the decision-making process.134  
The duration for decision-making on an application is not determined in the Statute, which can lead 
to delays in the licensing process, which may deter investment. Uganda does not have a time limit 
stipulated. 
3.1.2.3 Licence conditions  
The duration of the licences varies -basic telecommunications services (25 years -Tanzania, 25 
years [incumbent] 15[new entrants]- Kenya, 20 years -Uganda) and cellular mobile (15 years -
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda). 
CCK prescribes the conditions for all licences granted in Kenya, including obligations under 
international conventions such as the WTO requirements.135  
The Minister, in Tanzania, may after consultation with the TCRA give directions with regard to 
conditions to be included in licences and guidelines relating to issuing, varying or cancelling of 
licences which increases possibility of political interference.136  
UCC prescribes the terms and conditions of all operators’ licences in Uganda and these can include 
specifications of apparatus to be installed or used; location and personnel to use such apparatus; 
                                                 
130 Government of Uganda-Ministry of Transport, Works and Communications,  ‘Communications’, posted at 
www.miniworks.go.ug/commdept1 viewed on 26/06/2004. 
131 Section 12 UCA. 
132 Kenya Communications Regulations 2001, Draft Licensing Regulations for Uganda and Tanzania Licensing 
Guidelines. 
133 Tanzania Licensing Guidelines; posted at www.tcc.go.tz/Guidelines_telecom viewed on 04/10/04. 
134 Section 18(2) TCC Act. 
135 Regulation 10, 11 Kenya Communications Regulations. 
136 Section 7 TCC Act. 
 34
and the provision of services to rural and sparsely populated areas 137and provision of the service 
for which the licence was obtained.138 In addition, all licence holders are under obligation to 
comply with relevant international conventions, regulations and recommendations139 such as the 
GATS ABT. 
Additional conditions can be imposed on public operators such as interconnection obligations and 
others are statutory.140 A public operator is required not to show undue preference to or exercise 
undue discrimination against any person141 so to promote competition and ensure 
interconnection142 the cornerstone of competition in the sector.143 In 2000, Celtel Uganda indicated 
licence limitation as a problem.144  
 
3.1.2.4 Exclusivity Period  
The law in Kenya does not specifically provide for exclusivity periods, which implies that the 
exclusivity periods vary depending on negotiations between CCK and operators. It is interesting 
that the Appeals Tribunal struck out Telkom Kenya’s exclusivity to provide the Internet 
gateway.145
TCRA defines exclusivity of licence as any condition granted to a licensee or operator to provide 
certain services thereby provided in the licence in exclusion of other operators for a number of 
years specified in the licence.146
In Uganda, UCA is silent on the exclusivity period probably granted to operators just as one of the 
terms; however an explanation is available on the UCC website. UTL and the SNO enjoy duopoly 
exclusivity for 5 years upto 25 July 2005, restricting protected telephony services to them and those 
service providers licensed prior to the beginning of the exclusivity period to provide the same. 
Currently the exclusivity rights to the international super gateway through the satellite have 
                                                 
137 Section 35 UCA. 
138 Section 35 UCA. 
139 Section 41. 
140 This was the case for MTN and UTL. S. 58 UCA precludes UTL and the SNO from holding or acquiring ownership 
interests in the other company or any of its affiliates. 
141 Section 43. 
142 Conditions being non-denial of service and equality of treatment of operators. 
143 Section 58 UCA. Other conditions are stipulated in the Fourth Schedule and the Licensing regulations. 
144 E. Bakibinga and J.M. Bagonza; Information on the Management and Operations of the cellular Phone Service 
Providers in the Telecommunications Subsector in Uganda, Uganda Parliamentary Research Service, April 2000.  
145 G. Opiyo; ‘Internet Gateway thrown open as Tribunal revokes monopoly’, posted at 
http://www.eastandard.net/intelligence/intel31070423.htm viewed on 04/10/2004. 
146 Section 3 TCRA Act. 
 35
deterred competition and resulted in high Internet charges in Uganda.147 Exclusivity periods which 
are justified as monopoly rights and restricted entry lower the cost of capital and make financing 
easier make it difficult for upcoming competitors to exploit new technologies such as the use of 
VoIP.148
3.1.2.5 Licensing Fees 
CCK is empowered to charge licence fees in Kenya149 and the application fees for licences to 
operate local, international, or cellular mobile systems is an annual licence fee of 125 USD and an 
annual operating fee of 0.5% of audited annual gross turnover of the company. 
In Tanzania TCRA collects an initial licence fee of 10,000 USD and an annual fee of 0.8% of 
audited annual gross turnover of the company.150  
UCC determines and levies licence fees, which become part of its funds as revenue. These fees are 
determined by the UCC upon consideration of administrative charges operators pay a one-off 
negotiated amount and 1% annual gross turnover plus spectrum fees. MTN negotiated and paid an 
initial licence fee of USD 5.6 Million.151
3.1.2.6 Licensing Enforcement 
CCK has established a number of licensing enforcement mechanisms and the Telecommunications 
Licence Enforcement Unit (TLEU) is responsible for: promoting and enforcing fair competition 
among operators by investigating complaints and reporting to the CCK which takes action ranging 
from cease and desist orders to payment of fines; enforcing the requirements for licensing by 
monitoring; enforcing licence conditions by designing and ensuring that all licences comply with 
the conditions; enforcing standards; conducting routine inspections of premises and facilities to 
determine compliance and conformity with recognised standards and implementing sanctions 
imposed by law.152
TCRA can make a compliance order to a person to refrain from contravening conduct or to take 
actions necessary for compliance with the law, impose sanctions for violation of terms of licence 
                                                 
147 Parliament of Uganda, Committee Report- Communications Sub-sector, posted  at www.parliament.go..ug viewed 
on 24/07/2004. 
148 N. Klein and P. Gray; ‘Competition in the Network Industries-Where and How to Introduce It’, Private Sector, 
World Bank, Note No. 104, January 1997. See M. Mureithi; Summary Report of the Proceedings of the 4th Annual 
AITEC Summit. 
149 Regulation 4, Kenya Communications Regulations.  
150 Section 49 TCRA Act & Licensing Guidelines. 
151 E. Bakibinga and J.M. Bagonza; Supra, Note 144. 
152 Section 100 Kenya Communication Regulations 2001. 
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and to investigate compliance with licence conditions.153 Contravention of a licence conditions can 
result in cancellation or suspension of the licence or imposition of fines.154 Penalties can be 
imposed for operating without a licence. 
In Uganda, every licensee is required to annually prepare and submit to UCC a report of operations 
and services and to the extent to which the conditions of the licence are followed.155 UCC has 
investigative and inspection powers (can issue letters of inquiry to get information) that can be 
delegated to a Committee.156 In case of breach, UCC can impose sanctions.157 UCC upon its own 
motion or upon a complaint filed by another party conducts inspections of licensed facilities and 
takes necessary action. In case of breach, UCC may issue warnings, impose monetary fines, revoke 
licences, seize equipment or commence criminal proceedings. Regulations to ensure compliance 
spell out the tools for investigation and penalties for non-compliance.158
The limitations to effective enforcement have been identified as: inadequate staffing, lack of 
necessary equipment, inadequate technical competence, interference by politicians and local 
government authorities, the lack of home-grown regulatory practices and absence of the necessary 
institutional framework such as the Appeals Tribunal which has not yet been appointed.159
3.1.2.7 Judicial Review Process 
Section 102 KCA establishes an Appeals Tribunal for purposes of arbitrating in cases where 
disputes arise in Kenya and this is in place.160
In Tanzania, appeals from decisions made by the TCRA lie with the Fair Competition Tribunal 
whose decision shall be final. 
Uganda’s system provides for a Tribunal consisting of a judge and 2 other persons appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.161 The tribunal can appoint 
technical advisors, identified by the Minister, to assist in the execution of its functions and has 
                                                 
153 Section 45(3) TCRA Act. 
154 Section 20 TCC Act. 
155 Section 49 UCA. 
156 section 50 UCA. There is an enforcement unit. 
157 section 53 UCA. 
158 The Uganda Communications (Enforcement Procedures) Regulations 2004, SI No. 41/2004. 
159 ITU, ‘Domestic enforcement of telecom laws and regulations and the limitations: Uganda's experience’, posted at 
http://www.itu.int/md/meetingdoc.asp?lang=e&type=sfolders&parent=D02-RGQ18.1-C&source=Uganda viewed 
19/07/2004. 
160 Under   the Chairmanship of a retired Chief Justice, Majid Cockar. 
161 Section 76 UCA. 
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jurisdiction to hear and determine all issues relating to the UCA including licensing matters. An 
appeal from the tribunal lies with the Court of Appeal, the second highest court of judicature.162 
Financial constraints have stalled the appointment of the tribunal affecting the resolution of 
disputes as courts at times refer complainants back to UCC, which usually handles technical 
matters only and encourages arbitration.163
3.1.2.8 WTO Obligations164
Kenya has a number of obligations concerning market-access, resale of excess capacity, foreign 
investment and exemptions in the telecommunications sector.165 For non-public use of 
telecommunications services, there are limitations on market access except through the 
incumbent’s network. Competition is therefore inhibited as the incumbent is protected. 
Tanzania has not established sector-specific commitments for the sector. Uganda adopted the 
regulatory guidelines under the WTO and undertook a number of specific commitments/limitations 
on market access pertaining to presence of natural persons, requirement of registration and other 
market access issues. Upto 2003 only 3 operators were to have cellular mobile licences and any 
operator would have to be registered in Uganda. These market access restrictions would deter 
market entry. 
3.1.2.9 Investment Regime and Environment 
The Kenyan government restricts foreign ownership in the sector to 40%. The equity participation 
requirements are that any firm seeking a licence to operate in the liberalised market segments 
would require minimum 30% of equity under Kenyan ownership and for listed companies, there is 
need to conform to the regime governing capital markets.166  
The Monopolies and Prices Commission Act allows the Commissioner to determine matters that 
may affect competition in the economy including companies in the telecommunications 
business.167
                                                 
162 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and Judicature Act Cap 13 Laws of Uganda. 
163 Interview with officials in UCC Licensing Department conducted 30/09/2004. 
164 See Annex III for details on country-specific obligations. 
165 Details are available at the World Trade Organisation website at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_ehtm  viewed on 22/06/2004. 
166 In July 2002, the rules were amended to allow foreign ownership of up to 75% and investment could only be 
increased with prior written approval of the Capital Markets Authority. 
167 Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act, Cap 504 of the Laws of Kenya  posted at 
http://www.treasury.go.ke/mon_law_part1htm viewed on 14/07/2004. 
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Investment is regulated by a dated law, which sets out to protect certain approved foreign 
investments.168 The Investment Promotion Centre (IPC) is a one-stop centre where potential 
investors can get clearance and licensing of their businesses. 169  
All investment license applications in Tanzania are subject to 35% local participation for approval 
and this may be a barrier to entry for those unable to raise the percentage required. 
Foreign investors can only employ a maximum of five expatriate workers, which is a limitation. 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) the primary agency of Government coordinates, encourages, 
promotes and facilitates investment in Tanzania and advises Government on investment matters. 170 
The Centre issues a formal Certificate of Incentives, which serves as the official recognition of 
one's investment status in the country.171
Uganda is an attractive investment location because of its strategic geographical location, a fully 
liberalised economy as well as a predictable and stable economic environment.172 Uganda provides 
a competitive incentive regime including activities aimed at lowering barriers to regional trade, 
removed all restrictions on international capital transactions and carried out privatisation 
exercises.173 Telecommunications services take priority for investment and providers qualify for 
incentives.174
The Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) issues investment licences and assists in securing other 
licences and secondary approvals for investors.175 There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of 
investments and no barriers to remittance of dividends.  
                                                 
168 The Foreign Investments Protection Act 1964, posted at http://www.kenyalaw.com/mainpagehtm  viewed on 
14/07/2004. 
169 Investment Promotion Centre Act Cap 485 of 1986, posted at www.ipckenya.org/docs/main.htm viewed on 23rd 
June 2004. The policy aims at the development of a comprehensive framework that creates an enabling environment 
for investment in Kenya and one of the strategies is to ensure speedy enactment of an investment code that brings 
stability and predictability in the investment environment.  
170 Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 of 1997.  
171 Tanzania-Investor’s Guide, posted at http://www.unido.org/doc/8060 viewed on 14/07/2004. 
172 ‘Brief Guide to Investing in Uganda’, posted at http://www.unido.org/userfiles/GaveauG/InvestUganda.pdf viewed 
on 14/07/2004. 
173 The Uganda Transport and Communications Profile at www.ugandainvest.com/transport.pdf  viewed on 
16/07/2004. 
174 Investment Code Act Cap 92, Schedule 2 Laws of Uganda. 
175 Ibid.  Details on the regime are available in Annex VI. 
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3.1.3 East African Region 
3.1.3.1 General Overview and Sector Performance 
Telecommunications markets are increasingly opening up at regional level, necessitating service 
providers to widen their scope in terms of business and competitive strategies.176 The sector, in 
EAC, has survived setbacks namely: the continuing rural-urban digital divide, high tariffs for 
various services, virtual stagnation of growth of fixed lines and discontinuation of the 
implementation of the Digital Transmission project.177 Following liberalisation in the sector, a 
large number of investors have been attracted. The regulators have been quite effective in ensuring 
a level playing field in the new liberalised environment, making sure that the new actors meet their 
roll out objectives and that the services provided are of high quality and affordable.178 However the 
regulators face difficulties in enforcing obligations and penalties on operators for non-compliance 
especially in case of the incumbent where government is majority shareholder.179 Constraints to 
cross-border trade and investment are due to limited developments of communication networks in 
the region and the inadequacies in the rules and regulations governing trade, payments and 
investments in the different countries.180
There have been numerous attempts to develop programmes and projects for a common market in 
telecommunications181, which activities aim at establishing a regulatory framework that will 
promote sectoral and general economic development.  
3.1.3.2 Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework 
The EAC seeks to ultimately establish an export-oriented economy allowing free movement of 
goods, persons, labour, services, capital, information and technology. EAC aims at achieving co-
operation in infrastructure and services such as co-ordinated, harmonised and complementary 
communication services and involves.182 This co-operation involves the ministries responsible for 
communication, institutions responsible for telecommunications and the EAC secretariat and 
                                                 
176 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra, Note 1,  p1-22. 
177 EAC Secretariat; Final Report Preliminary Study on Harmonisation of Regional Communications Strategy, Arusha, 
November 2003, P.4. 
178 Ibid., P.22. 
179 Ibid. 
180 J. Mwandosya, Minister for Communications and Transport, Tanzania; ‘Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure 
Development: Tanzania and the East African Region’, Commonwealth-Tanzania Investment Conference, Dar-es-
Salaam, May 2003, posted at http://www.cbcglobelink.com/cbcglobelink/events/Tanzania/AccessPresentations viewed 
on 14/07/2004. 
181 See Annex II.   
182 Articles 89-101  and Chapter 15 EAC Treaty. 
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targets: adopting common policies; improving and maintaining interconnectivity; harmonising 
tariffs; co-operating in training and exchange of manpower; adoption of a common frequency 
management and monitoring scheme; and finalisation of the privatisation process of the 
telecommunications companies. The EAC seeks to develop a single investment area and remove 
obstacles to the development of a common market183and to adopt common telecommunication 
policies in collaboration with other relevant international organisations.184  
The Treaty provides for an institutional framework for the achievement of these goals. The 
Council185 is the policy organ and its Regulations, Directives, Decisions and Recommendations are 
binding on the Partner States, all organs and institutions of the EAC except the Summit, the Court 
of Justice and the Legislative Assembly (enacts legislation).186 The East African Court of Justice is 
mandated to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with 
the Treaty but can have other mandate as determined by the Council.187
Sectoral committees are responsible for developing priorities in respect to the sector.188 The 
Secretariat initiates studies and research related to, and the implementation of programmes for the 
most appropriate way for achieving the objectives of the Treaty.189
The formulation of a common competition policy and law was identified as one of the activities 
aimed at operationalising a common market, which means that government regulation remains for 
sometime.190 The Assembly is slated to enact the EAC competition law.  
The Heads of State signed the protocol establishing the Customs Union, which aims at the faster 
socio-economic transformation of the region as a single market and investment area and creating a 
viable integrated East African market to stimulate production, investments and trade both regional 
and international.191 The union aims at eliminating non-tariff barriers on all goods imported; 
introducing national treatment for Partner States.192  
                                                 
183 Articles 80 & 82 EAC Treaty. 
184 Article 99 EAC Treaty. 
185 The Ministers responsible for regional co-operation. 
186 Articles 14-16 EAC Treaty. 
187 Articles 23 and 27 EAC Treaty. 
188 Article 21 EAC Treaty. 
189 Article 71 EAC Treaty. 
190 EAC Secretariat; EAC Development Strategy (2001-2005). 
191 EAC, ‘Fifth Summit of Heads of State of the EAC-Joint Communiqué’, posted at 
www.eac.int/news_2004_03_communique_sumit viewed 04/07/2004.  
192 The Treaty provides for the establishment of a customs union, to be followed by a common market, then a monetary 
union and subsequently a political federation. The establishment of the union is considered a step towards the creation 
of a common market, which is basically the next stage in the East African regional integration process. 
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It is important to strengthen approaches at EAC level and establish regulatory procedures that 
permit an operator to be licensed only once for the entire region.193 The development of a common 
market requires the opening up of markets to supranational carriers and ventures. Liberalisation 
leads to the emergence of global communications network alliances and carriers, to new types of 
service providers and to an end of the traditional notion of telecommunications as a national and 
territorial sector.194 In this regard, market entry should be made possible on EAC-wide basis.  
The East African Regulatory, Postal and Telecommunications Organisation (EARPTO) is a forum 
that seeks to harmonize and enhance development in the sector.195 EARPTO promotes the 
improvement of postal and telecommunications services among the Member States. It works to 
harmonise regulations, share experiences on policy-making issues, and support training for 
personnel of the relevant government agencies. It also provides a forum for the EAC to formulate a 
unified position on the issues so that it can speak with one voice for the region at ITU meetings.196 
The need to harmonise policy at regional level and the enactment of legislations for the accelerated 
development of communications in the region has been emphasised at EARPTO meetings.197 
EARPTO looks forward to a common licensing platform to be achieved by identifying common 
aspects without changing policies then eventual harmonisation of policy.198
The Preliminary study on Harmonisation of Regional Communications Strategy, commissioned by 
the EAC Secretariat, made a number of findings outstanding of which was that one of the 
persisting problems in the sector is the regulatory divergence, which creates a problem to investors 
and hinders co-ordinated development of the sector in East Africa. The communications regulatory 
regime though created from similar policies in the region has quite significant divergences as 
evident in the three laws-the differences being in aesthetic, structural and substantive nature 
necessitating harmonisation.199  
                                                 
193 F. Tusubira; Uganda: Challenges of the Digital Divide and Telecommunications Sector’, posted at 
www.foundation-partnership.org/linchpin/Uganda.htm viewed on 14/07/2004. 
194 E. Noam and A. Singhal, Supra, Note 39. 
195 Bridges; ‘Session: ICT policy institutions and key issues -- international, regional, and national’, posted at 
http://www.bridges.org/resources/apc_training/ict_policy_primer.html viewed on 04/10/2004 
196 Ibid. 
197 Mr. E. Yonazi- East African Community (EAC) – Secretariat, Report of The 11th East African Regulatory, Posts 
and Telecommunications Organisations (EARPTO) Meeting held in Kampala, Uganda, 14th May 2002, posted at 
http://www.ucc.co.ug/conferences/earptoReport.doc , viewed on 14/07/2004. 
198 Interview with officials in UCC Licensing Department conducted 30/09/2004. 
199 EAC Secretariat; Supra ,Note 175, p. 22. 
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This study provides justification for the harmonisation of the regulatory framework for a number of 
reasons that are highlighted in Annex V. 
With regard to licensing, the study recommends that: procedures for licensing should be singular 
and straight forward for both telecommunications and radio communication and licences be 
granted by one authority; and there should be uniform licensing procedures and conditions for all 
applicants-14 days in which to give reasons for refusal to issue licence and a right of appeal. The 
Communications laws should make reference to relevant provisions of national laws on 
competition for ease of reference.200  This study is very relevant because it provides a sound basis 
for any further attempts to examine the possibility of having a common regime at East African 
level and has managed to point out the divergences likely to negatively impact the development of 
a common telecommunications market.  
3.1.3.4 General Observations on Licensing Regime in East Africa 
The review of country sector performance has revealed that the sector is growing, contributing to 
the GDPs of Partner States and there is considerable effort to ease on barriers to market entry. 
Kenya started with a slow growth rate but has caught up and overtaken the other two although 
preliminary historical data indicates that the Kenya communications market has been larger than 
those of Uganda and Tanzania combined. Policy objectives are similar in all three countries with a 
few variations. 
At the EAC level, telecommunications has attracted attention as evident from the projects and other 
proposed activities. However a number of differences stand out in licensing and in the investment 
regimes, all of which determine market entry. 
3.1.3.5 Privatisation, Liberalisation and Market Structure 
The market structure reflects full competition in some market segments, partial competition and 
full monopoly in others. There are different approaches to telecommunication service provision. 
Uganda used competition to drive development by licensing a SNO, while Kenya used Initial 
Public Offering (the first sale of stock whether debts and/or equity by a private company to the 
                                                 
200  Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act, 1987-Kenya, Fair Competition Act 2003 Tanzania 
and Ugandan law on restrictive trade practices, monopolies and price control.  See EAC Secretariat; Supra, Note 175, 
p. 28. 
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public) and Tanzania a combination of both licences in rural areas.201 The effect of divergent 
approaches to liberalisation and privatisation in the sector is the development of limitations 
affecting the investment regime. Each of the Partner States has a different liberalisation schedule 
for the market segments.  For example, Kenya has full competition for leased lines; partial 
competition in mobile while Tanzania has monopoly for leased lines and full competition in 
mobile.  
Market entry is limited if for one Partner State, there is exclusivity for a particular service yet there 
is full competition in another. A company with interest in providing services across the region will 
have to reconsider the investment decision. Another critical aspect about privatisation is that Kenya 
Telkom was created as a result of corporation approach202 so that for sometime the government of 
Kenya retained 100% ownership. The effect of this is that government and politicians will interfere 
unduly with the regulation of the sector usually to the detriment of new entrants. Reports from a 
number of studies illustrate that the problem with having a state-owned incumbent is that chances 
of political interference with the regulatory process increase. Worse still, Uganda does not have a 
law regulating monopolies. 
3.1.3.6 Regulator’s Mandate 
The key players are NRAs, policy makers, including EAC institutions. The mandate of a NRA has 
a great impact on licensing decisions and enforcement of licensing conditions. Having divergences 
arises from the policy makers’ intentions and sometimes how the draft-person reflects those 
intentions. CCK appears to have a broader mandate (ability to encourage cross-border operations), 
which TCRA and UCC do not expressly appear to have. What this means for a common market is 
to render some regulators helpless in the face of such transactions unless they depend on the 
incidental clause of the provision granting the mandate, that leaves more room for discretion. 
Whether this can have a negative consequence remains to be seen. In all Partner States, the 
regulatory authority grants operators licences and allocates and licences use of radio frequency 
spectrum which makes it easier on applicants to deal with one institution, limiting the possibility of 
frustration if one licence is granted and not the other.  
                                                 
201 M. Mureithi, ‘African Telecommunications Infrastructures for Information Access’, UDT Occasional Papers IFLA 
UDT Core Programme Occasional Paper # 7 posted at http://www.ifla.org/VI/5/op/udtop7/udtop7.htm viewed on 
19/07/2004. 
202 See Noam and Singhal; Supra Note 39 about types of privatisation in telecommunications. 
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Regulatory differences are often ascribed to differences in the legal, institutional, political or 
cultural framework of different countries, which differences are significant but do not justify 
substantial differences in technical or economic aspects of regulation203 and this is evident in the 
EAC region. UCC has a broad mandate to regulate market entry although a lot of ministerial 
involvement is permitted, which may be undesirable for decision making. The competence of the 
body is dependent on the resources available to the regulator which if not adequate affects the 
performance. The mandate may mean nothing much if the NRA is not facilitated with adequate 
resources to execute its functions. 
The TCRA Act confers a lot of powers to the Minister, which may result in regulatory capture 
resulting in stifled competition and extensive disputes to the detriment of the sector. 204 Experience 
shows that whether or not sector development is free from political interference largely depends on 
the personalities involved and not the legal provisions per se. The disadvantage of provisions that 
permit excessive involvement of politicians is that they provide an excuse for political interference. 
Ministers are bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility205and in East Africa are elected 
representatives who may be re-called or voted out of office. In the circumstances, the involvement 
of politicians in the issuance of licences may not be a suitable option as political interests may 
ambush the decision-making process. Uganda appears to have the most independent regulator with 
the least ministerial oversight while Tanzania would appear to have the least independent 
regulator.206
UCC is expected to be more independent given the composition of the Commission (non-political 
persons who are appointed on basis of their professional competence) yet the CCK Board has 
Permanent Secretaries, usually next in line to Ministers, as Members which may increase 
possibility of political influence. 
3.1.3.7 Ease of Interconnection at regional level 
CCK has a duty to facilitate persons providing telecommunications services to compete abroad and 
interconnection is very crucial for this. MTN and UTL have interconnection agreements with 
Telkom, Kenya, which indicates that it is possible to have regional interconnection agreements – 
                                                 
203 M. Tétrault and H. Intven; Supra, Note 1, p1-22. 
204 EAC Secretariat; Supra, Note 175, p. 27. 
205 It is an administrative law principle. Collective  ministerial responsibility means that as well as the individual 
responsibilities set out in law, members of the government must support agreed government policies and  have a 
collective responsibility to carry out government policies decided by cabinet or resign. 
206 EAC Secretariat; Supra, Note 175,  p. 27. 
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how far is this from these companies actually being able to participate directly in markets in other 
Partner States. Operators are free to negotiate cross-border interconnection agreements. 
3.1.3.8 Licensing Fees 
 The licensing fees vary especially with regard to the amount of the one-off payment and the 
percentage of the annual gross turnover. 
3.1.3.9 Licensing Process 
The licensing process can be described as more streamlined in Kenya and Tanzania where the 
process is clear but the regulators find the process easier in Uganda. There is need to speed up the 
licensing processes as slow and inefficient licensing procedures are some of the major barriers to 
investment.207
3.1.3.10 Investment Regime and Environment 
Each Partner State seeks to attract investors in the different sectors and have competed for these for 
many years. For a common market, it will be interesting to see how the investment regimes are 
harmonised to be able to attract investment in the region. Kenya must reduce the cost of doing 
business to attract foreign investment and this requires comprehensive liberalisation of the 
sector.208
The main issue is that in fully liberalising markets, there is no restriction on the number of 
licensees wishing to participate and competition is on first come first serve basis and /or through 
beauty contest while in the partially liberalised markets there are restrictions with open competitive 
tendering process.  
The incentive regime provided by the UIA is good but if what Kenya and Tanzania provide does 
not tally positively, market entry could be deterred by limited interest in investing. 
Political stability is a crucial factor in influencing investment decisions and therefore the transition 
from the movement system of politics209to multi-party politics will have a great impact on 
investment decisions not only in Uganda but also in the East African region, especially for 
investors interested in becoming regional operators. The current Heads of State are personally 
                                                 
207 F. Tusubira; Supra, Note 193.   
208 J. Michuki, Minister of Transport and Communications quoted in C. Ryan, Supra, Note 91. 
209 After 17 years of uninterrupted rule by President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda now faces a historic political test. It has 
to demonstrate that it has created the necessary institutions of government for a smooth power transfer from President 
Museveni and from non-party movement politics to multi-party democracy in 2006, posted at 
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2346&l=1 viewed on 27/06/2004.  
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committed to the regional integration effort and this commitment has been translated into timely 
decision-making and regular meetings of the Summit, the absence of which, as experience from the 
defunct EAC shows could have negative impacts on the development of a common market. Kenya 
and Tanzania on the other hand have had a relatively stable political environment since attaining 
independence, though corruption had reduced investor confidence in Kenya.210
3.1.3.11 WTO obligations 
Tanzania has not made any commitments under the sector with WTO, which means that NRAs and 
operators in Kenya and Uganda face more obligations than those in Tanzania, which will distort the 
market. 
3.1.3.12 Exclusivity periods  
The UCA and KCA do not contain definition or interpretation of exclusivity but the UCC website 
has an explanatory note about the meaning. The period is not fixed by law and is subject to 
negotiations, which explains the variations. If an upper limit is not set, licensees are able to get any 
period they bargain for. As long as exclusivity periods continue to run at non-coinciding times, this 
will affect operation at regional level because the fact that there is partial competition in some 
market segments in one country yet there is full competition in the same market segment in another 
country is bad for investors who seek to take advantage of the benefits of a regional market. The 
exclusivity period granted to operators is considered to be against the principles of competition but 
governments argue that exclusivity is aimed at safeguarding incoming investors because of small 
markets. With full competition these exclusive rights should cease to be.  
3.1.3.13 Judicial Review 
There are different judicial review processes involving different kinds of institutions with that of 
Uganda having the highest judicial authority being the second highest-ranking court of 
judicature.211 This should provide a boost for investor confidence. However, this Tribunal has not 
been established. The lack of a sector-specific body to handle appeals, in Tanzania, undermines the 
development of sector-rules as the competition authority may lack the competence required for 
                                                 
210 Institute of Economic Affairs, ‘Corruption in Kenya , A Call to Action’ , posted at 
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:STev5CI2yMIJ:www.eldis.org/fulltext/corruption4.pdf+investment+and+effect
+of+corruption+in+kenya&hl=en  viewed on 27/06/2004. 
211 Constitution of Republic of Uganda, 1995, Judicature Act Cap 13 Laws of Uganda. 
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telecommunications matters. Competition policy is generic and cannot cater for sector-specific 
issues.212
3.1.3.14 Institutional Arrangements 
Save for the general institutional set up for the EAC, the sectoral committee on communications 
will be expected to do more for the achievement of a common telecommunications market.  
EARPTO definitely has a major role to play in the development of a common telecommunications 
market though there is need for concerted effort with an EAC institution, with ability to make 
bonding policy and legislative decisions to take the lead. Efforts like EARPTO are not a panacea to 
all problems. 
3.2 Conclusion  
In light of technological and financial strengths of foreign investors, NRAs may be overwhelmed 
and may not be able to adequately regulate the sector even negotiate the licence conditions as 
desired. Lord Denning’s doctrine of unequal bargaining power continues to dog the negotiation of 
contracts for regulators in developing countries especially when foreign investors and international 
financial entities are involved.213The EU has developed a licensing regime for a single 
telecommunications market and an analysis of how the EU has handled the market entry issue in 
the next Chapter will shed light on what EAC can adopt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 P. Bijl and M. Pietz; Supra, Note 62. 
213 The doctrines states that English law gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a contract on 
terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining 
power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infancy, coupled with 
undue influence or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of others per Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank 
Ltd. v. Bundy (1975) Q.B. 326. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MARKET ENTRY IN EU: A COMPARISON WITH THE EAC 
This chapter contains an analysis of the legal regime governing market entry in the EU 
telecommunications service sector and a comparison with what is prevailing in the EAC as seen in 
Chapter Three so as to best assess what the EAC can learn from the EU experience. 
Much as there is a new regulatory package, in this study it is essential to examine the old regime 
which was designed to manage the transition from monopoly to competition with a focus to 
creating a competitive market and on the rights of new entrants as it is more relevant to the 
regulation of the telecommunications market in East Africa today. 
4.0 Introduction 
The European internal market, the world's largest in terms of the purchasing power,214 contributes 
to the integration of the European economy: increasing intra-Community trade and productivity.215 
The EU is considered the best way to bring supranational market forces under control.  
For telecommunications, the objectives of the EU include: to establish a Europe-wide integrated 
network; de-fragment national markets; and abolish regulatory inconsistencies among the Member 
States concerning tariffs, standards, access conditions, public procurement, among others.216
In the late 1980s, the European Commission (EC) embarked on a liberalisation programme of the 
telecommunications market; opening and restructuring markets to enable the exploitation of a 
substantial demand and innovation potentials in the industry.217 Focus has shifted from 
telecommunications services to electronic communication services as convergence makes the 
traditional separation of regulatory functions between the different components increasingly 
inappropriate. 218 The Internal Market requires the existence of advanced and sophisticated means 
of telecommunications and European planning and action in infrastructure policy, based on 
                                                 
214 370 million consumers (450 million after the enlargement). 
215 European Parliament; Principles and General Completion of the Internal Market, posted at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/3_1_0_en.htm viewed on 22/06/2004. 
216 Ibid.  
217 T. Kiessling and Y. Blondeel; The EU Regulatory framework in Telecommunications: A Critical Analysis, posted 
at http://itc.mit.edu/itel/pubs/kiessling_paper.pdf viewed on 22/06/2004. 
218 Under the new Directive the terms "electronic communications" and "electronic communications networks" include 
all electronic communications services and/or networks, which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by, wire, 
radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including therefore, the broadcasting of radio and television 
programmes.  
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knowledge of past successes and failures in infrastructure planning and the future needs of the 
economy so that the value added of European integration be reaped.219  
It is important to consider the principle of subsidiarity,220 which determines the Commission and 
NRAs’ actions and is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen.  
Market entry is regulated by a number of legal instruments at EU and national level- a two-tier 
system, where NRAs and to a limited extent national competition authorities have a decentralised 
role but based on EC Directives and subject to Commission and Court of Justice review if 
necessary.221  
Entry restrictions should be based on objective, non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent 
selection criteria relating to the availability of resources or on the basis of NRAs implementing 
award procedures on the same criteria.222 The policy development behind the new regulatory 
regime aimed at reducing administrative barriers to market entry so as to promote a competitive 
European market. The EU telecommunications legislation is founded on two complementary 
principles: liberalisation under Article 100a EC Treaty (introduced by the Single European Act) 
and harmonisation under Article 86 EC Treaty.223  
4.1 General Overview and Sectoral performance 
The combined financial performance of the national markets of the 15 member states was 
estimated to be Euro 251 billion in 2003 up from Euro 211 billion in 2000224though the level of 
investment in the sector varies country-wise as Table 6 illustrates.225  
                                                 
219 D. Banister, R. Capello and P. Nijkamp; European Transport and Communications: Lessons for the Future, in D. 
Banister, R. Capello and P. Nijkamp (eds); European Transport and Communications Networks: Policy Evolution and 
Change, John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 1995 p.335. 
220 It is the principle closely bound up with the principles of proportionality and necessity, whereby the Union does not 
take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken 
at national, regional or local level. 
221 J. Pelkmans; ‘A European Telecommunications Regulator?’ in P. Vass; ‘Network Industries in Europe: Preparing 
for Competition’, based on papers presented at a joint CEPS and Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries 
Conference held in Edinburgh 10-11 July 1997, pp.69-95, p.81. 
222 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of June 28 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services 
223 C. Watson, T. Whealdon and the Communications Practice; Telecommunications: The EU Law, Palladian Law 
Publishers, Bambridge. 1999. p.xiii 
224 European Commission; 9th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, p.25, 
posted at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/all_about/implementation_enforcement/annualreports/9threport/
index_en.htm viewed on 28/05/2004. (9th Implementation Report). 
225 See Annex VII 
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The initial reforms were directed toward market liberalisation and the extension of market services 
with the NRAs at the forefront.226 The 1987 Green Paper opened a Europe-wide debate on the 
telecommunications regulatory environment, so to adapt it to the requirements of a single European 
market.227 Licensing was crucial to Open Network Provision (ONP), permitting market entry for 
competition and the allocation of scarce resources.  
For ease of the single market development, the law evolved from the requirement of licences, with 
a few exceptions, to general authorisations. The Bangemann report signalled the need for the 
establishment at the European level of an authority to be charged with the minimum of necessary 
regulation concerning licensing, network interconnection, the management of scarce resources and 
general advice to the NRAs.228
The new regulatory framework229, which aims at making competition rules the prime instrument 
for regulating the market although sector-specific rules remain applicable in some instances, 
reduced the number of legal texts from 28 to eight.230 The flexibility of conditions stipulated in the 
new framework, has occasioned positive developments stimulating increased sectoral participation. 
The liberalisation of most information society markets has, depending on the services, partially 
been achieved with the initial stage resulting in a massive entry into the telecommunication 
services sector for instance a 113% increase between 1998-2001 in fixed telecommunications.231  
                                                 
226 W. Melody; ‘Trends in European Telecommunication: 2002 Status Report of Denmark’s progress in 
Telecommunication Reform’; September 2002, Technical University of Denmark, posted at 
http://www.itst.dk/static/publikationer/denmark_2002.pdf viewed 23/07/2004. 
227 European Commission; Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services 
and equipment (COM (87) 290). 
228 W. Sauter; The System of Open Network Provision Legislation, pp105-133, p.107 in W. Hadding & U. Schneider 
(eds); The Future of EC Telecommunications Law; Volume 19 Series of Publications by the Academy of European 
Law in Trier, Koln, Bundesanzelger, 1996.P.116. 
229 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 
[Official Journal L 201 of 31 July 2002], Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [Official Journal L 
108 of 24.04.2002], Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) [Official Journal L 108 of 24.04.2002], Directive 
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [Official Journal L 108 of 24.04.2002], Directive 
2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [Official Journal L 108 of 24.04.2002] and Decision 
676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy 
in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) [Official Journal L 108 of 24.04.2002]
230 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer; ‘The New EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications’, December 
2001, posted at http://www.freshfields.com/practice/corporate/publications/pdfs/2315.pdf viewed 26/07/2004. 
231 9th Implementation Report 
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The development of the sector in EU is a culmination of policy changes concerning the role of 
telecommunications in the development of an internal market in light of globalisation. 
The debate whether to have a single regulator or to continue relying on the NRAs to implement the 
regulatory package continues. 
4.2 Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Licensing 
A broad range of legislative instruments regulates the EU sector and those with direct relevance to 
market access or entry are analysed here. 
The legal basis for regulating telecommunications in the EU market derives from provisions of the 
EU Treaty.232 The Single European Act,233 a revision of the Treaty of Rome aimed at incorporating 
the specific concept of the internal market in the Treaty defining it as ‘an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’.  
The European Court of Justice has confirmed the authority of the Commission to use competition 
law to liberalise telecommunications markets. 234
4.2.1 The Old Regulatory Framework 
The Commission adopted the Services Directive 90/388235 to abolish the exclusive rights granted 
by the Member States in the telecommunications services sector; with the exception of voice 
telephony (was extended to mobile and personal communications through Directive 96/2). The 
Commission decided that the Directive take effect on the adoption of the ONP framework 
directive236 which laid down the ground rules for harmonisation of conditions of access to and use 
of public telecommunications networks. Council Resolution 18/9/1995237 recognised as a key 
factor, the establishment in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, of common principles for 
general authorisations and individual licensing regimes.  
                                                 
232 Articles 28-31 (ex 30-37) (free movement of goods), Articles 43-55 (ex 52-66) (freedom to perform services and the 
right of establishment), Articles 81, 82, 86 (ex 85, 86, 90) (competition), Articles 95 (ex 100a) (standardisation), 
Articles 154-156 (ex 129b, c, d) (Trans-European networks) and Articles 157 (ex 130) (industry). The provisions 
indicated in italics were the former references in the Maastricht Treaty.  
233 Article 18 (8a) The Single European Act was signed in February 1986 and came into force on 1 July 1987 
234 France v The Commission of the European Communities, Case C 202/88, Decision of 19 March 1991. 
235 Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services 
(90/388/EEC) posted at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/90388eec.html viewed 22/05/2004. 
236 Council directive 90/387/EEC (amended later by the EP and Council Directive 97/51/EC for the purpose of 
adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications). 
237 Council Resolution 18/9/1995 on the implementation of the future regulatory framework for telecommunications  
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Commission Directive 96/19/EC, opened up the telecommunications market (including voice 
telephony) was to full competition on 1 January 1998 with a few exceptions.  
The Maastricht Treaty mandated the Community to help to establish and develop Trans-European 
networks of telecommunications infrastructures, to contribute to economic and social cohesion 
through the interconnection and interoperability of national networks.238 The requirements of 
European integration suggested that the internal market should eventually culminate in a fully 
integrated market on national lines: what might be termed the ‘European home market'.239 In 
absence of an adequate regulatory framework at that level, intending entrants would be faced with 
barriers. 
The Community's competition rules are a condition for achieving the internal market. The 
Commission is responsible for application of the competition rules. The Full Competition 
Directive240 applied. The abolition of exclusive and special rights as regards the provision of voice 
telephony was to allow national operators to directly provide service in other Member State.241 
National operators were considered to have exclusive or special rights to provide the underlying 
infrastructure, including the acquisition of indefeasible rights of use in international circuits. 
The Licensing Directive (97/13) addressed the harmonisation aspects of licensing aiming at 
standardising procedures and requirements imposed on new entrants wishing to join the liberalised 
market. The guiding principles for licensing were proportionality, objectivity, non-discrimination 
and transparency. The intention was for the licensing regime to provide the lightest touch possible 
to be compatible and consistent with the general principles of freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide new services quickly and to encourage the widespread application of 
technological improvements.242 The Directive contributed significantly market entry by clarifying 
and publicising the necessary conditions to be attached to authorisations and licences to ensure 
compliance with essential requirements. States could only limit the number of individual licences 
                                                 
238 The Maastricht Treaty provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a 
view to establishing the European Community, 1992. 
239 Decision No 1336/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1997 on a series of guidelines 
for Trans-European telecommunications networks [Official Journal L 183 of 11.07.1997] amended by Decision No 
1376/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 amending Decision No 1336/97/EC 
[Official Journal L 200 of 30.07.2002].
240 96/19/EC Directive amending 90/388/EC with regard to the implementation of full competition in the 
telecommunications markets, posted at http://145.18.106.100/doc/telecomrecht/eu/en/96_19_EC.pdf viewed 
26/07/2004. 
241 Recital 6, Ibid.  
242 C. Watson, T. Whealdon & the Communications Practice; Supra 223. P.xiii 
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for any category of telecommunications services only to the extent required for allocating scarce 
resources. 
Member States were required to ensure that NRAs co-ordinate, where possible, their authorisation 
procedures at the request of an undertaking intending to provide service or operate a network in 
more than one Member State. The NRAs were to shorten time limits for taking licensing decisions 
and to implement procedures regardless of national provisions relating to language requirements.243
Conditions attached to authorisations had to be consistent with competition rules of the EU Treaty 
and those on individual licences had to be justified and proportionate. The Directive regulated 
enforcement of conditions, fees, licensing new services as well as a one- stop shopping 
procedure244 for issuance of individual licences to undertakings applying for such licences in more 
than one Member State and notifications of intention to operate under authorisations, which was 
crucial because of the role of licensing. 
Member States were required in the formulation and application of their authorisation systems, to 
facilitate the provision of services between Member States.245 Interconnection was closely linked to 
the licensing process because the terms on which it is granted are key to the economics of 
competing operators and with the liberalised telecommunications market in the EU, cross-border 
interconnection became of increasing importance.246
The Licensing Committee (representative of Member States and Commission) specifically 
addressed development of regulatory activities. 
The Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package found: 
(i). Considerable differences in licensing-time limits, validity periods, charges and the 
classification of operators. 
(ii). Member States used the wide margin left to issue licences and not authorisations; charged 
high fees; imposed cumbersome information requirements; implemented discretionary 
conditions as mandatory and used numbering schemes to defeat competition. 
                                                 
243 Recital 16 Licensing Directive 
244 Article 13 Licensing Directive. The one-stop-shopping procedure is a procedural arrangement facilitating the 
obtaining of individual licences from or in the case of general authorisations and if required, the notification to more 
than one NRA, in a co-ordinated procedure and at a single location.  
245 Article 3(4) Licensing Directive 
246 C.  Watson, Supra Note 223 xxii  
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(iii). The one-stop-shopping procedure failed. 
4.2.2 The New Regulatory Framework 
The Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) and the Authorisations Directive (2002/20/EC) are the 
most directly relevant to market entry.  
The Competition Directive seeks to ensure that every undertaking has the right to provide 
electronic communications services or put in place, extend or exploit electronic communication 
networks without restriction.247 Five principles underpin the new regulatory framework at 
Community and national level providing that the future regulation should: be based on clearly 
defined policy objectives; be the minimum necessary to meet those objectives248; further enhance 
legal certainty in a dynamic market; aim to be technologically neutral249 and be enforced as closely 
as possible to the activities being regulated whether regulation has been agreed globally, regionally 
or nationally.  
The Authorisations Directive proposed: using general authorisations as the basis for licensing 
communication networks and services, with specific authorisations reserved for the assignment of 
radio spectrum and numbers; ensuring that the fees for authorisations cover only justifiable and 
relevant administrative costs, drawing on the expertise of a new High Level Communications 
Group involving the Commission and NRAs to help improve the consistent application of 
Community legislation and maximise the uniform application of national measures; reviewing 
existing legal provisions with a view to strengthening the independence of NRAs, ensuring an 
effective division of responsibilities between the different institutions at national level, improving 
co-operation between sector-specific and general competition authorities, and requiring transparent 
decision-making procedures at national level.250  
Only a reasoned opinion on the part of the competent regulatory authority within the framework of 
a general request for authorisation may prevent operation. The Directive aims at strengthening the 
internal market, by harmonising and simplifying rules and conditions so that operators do not face 
                                                 
247 The Commission Directive of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communication 
networks and services 2002/77/EC [Official Journal L 249, 17.09.2002].
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the right to provide services or exploit networks, without discrimination, in accordance with a general authorisation 
regime, which replaces the licensing system. 
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widely divergent licence regimes or fees in each Member State. The Member State retained the 
right to assign frequencies although access conditions, procedures and usage could be harmonised. 
4.2.3 Licensing Mandate and Regulatory Effectiveness 
There are variations across the EU as to which body issues licences for telecommunications service 
operation and which body executes the oversight function as reflected in Table 7 Annex VII. The 
mandate to grant licences lies with the NRA or Ministry depending on what the national legislation 
provides. 
The different approaches to legislative drafting and regulation specifically have affected the 
transposition as in some Member States, the objectives enshrined in the national law do not directly 
reflect the regulatory objectives provided in Article 8, Framework Directive. The question is 
whether this is occasioned by legal philosophical differences. Individual EU members have not 
adopted exactly the same stance regarding the development of telecommunications policy, with the 
Anglo-Saxon-type approach leaning more towards simple internal efficiency of an industry while 
the continental philosophy looks at regulation in a broader context placing regulatory controls 
closer to government.251
Political influence is likely to increase when the government wholly or partially owns or controls 
the incumbent. However in most Member States, the independence of the NRA from all 
organisations providing services is assured. 252 It is expected that in cases where a number of key 
decisions require the consent of the NRA officials appointed by the Ministry; review of decisions 
by the Ministry or transfer of some tasks, independence or impartiality may be ensured by the 
general principles of administrative law or other legislative instruments. In some countries some 
powers to act have not been explicitly conferred on the NRA. 
The NRAs have the mandate to impose sanctions and enforce decisions though some market 
players have complained of unnecessary intervention just to achieve a given vision of what the 
market should look like.253 This can hinder sector development. 
                                                 
251 K. Button; ‘European Telecommunications policy’, in European Transport and Communications Networks: Policy 
Evolution and Change, D. Banister, R. Capello and P. Nijkamp, John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 1995 p.312. See S. 
Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Sialnes & A. Shleyer; ‘The Regulation of Entry’, June 2001. 
252 9th Implementation Report  
253 Teligen Ltd.; ‘Study on Market Entry Issues in the EU Telecommunications Markets after 1st January 1998-A 
Report for the European Commission’, 26th July 2000.p.34 posted at 
http://www.researcha.com/pooled/articles/BF_WEBART/view.asp?Q=BF_WEBART_1243 viewed on 28/05/2004. 
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Some NRAs have been considered to lack technical skills to challenge the incumbent that has 
better trained human resources than the regulator or other operators have which places the NRA at 
the mercy of the incumbent.254
4.2.4 Licensing Process 
Under the Licensing Directive, for authorisations, the operator had to notify the NRA. In the case 
of individual licences, the procedure was determined by the Member State. Where individual 
licences were granted in case of allocation of scarce resources, consideration had to be taken of a 
number of factors. 
The speed of process and the existence of defined timeframes are both critical to encouraging 
investment and competitive market entry.255 Research shows that in the countries leading in sector 
investment such as UK, and Finland, it was relatively easy to obtain a licence to provide 
telecommunications services.256 The opposite is true in Member States such as France where there 
is a tedious licensing process. 
4.2.5 Enforcement  
Non-compliance with a condition attached to the licence, may lead the NRA to withdraw, amend or 
suspend the individual licence or impose compliance measures. The time frame is very elaborate. 
Proper implementation of the procedural requirements of the Authorisation Directive governing 
compliance with the conditions is in question as there are variations in national application. 
4.2.6 Judicial Review 
Member States are required to lay down an appropriate procedure for appeals against licensing 
decisions and appeals should be to an independent institution, not influenced by the NRA. Some 
Member States have provided that decisions stand pending appeal only if there is a specific order 
by the NRA to that effect yet the Framework Directive requires that decisions should stand unless 
the appeal body decides otherwise. The possibility of appealing decisions of the regulator and the 
way in which such appeals are implemented in practice can significantly impact the effectiveness 
of a regulatory regime.257
                                                 
254 Ibid. p.33 
255 ECTA, Jones Day & SPC Network; ‘Regulatory Scorecard, Report on the relative effectiveness of the Regulatory 
frameworks in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom’, posted at http://www.spcnetwork.co.uk/uploads/Scorecard.pdf viewed on 19/07/2004. 
256 Teligen Ltd.; Supra Note 253. p.30 
257 ECTA, Supra, Note 255. 
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4.2.7 Licensing Fees 
The Licensing Directive required that fees only cover the administrative costs incurred in the 
issuance, management, control and enforcement of the applicable individual licences and these 
should be proportionate to the work involved and published.258 Charges were only to be imposed to 
ensure the optimal use of scarce resources. There are disparities in licence fees ranging from 
Germany, which has ‘one-off’ initial high licence costs, ranging between 1.5 to 5.4 million Euros; 
France, which has an annual fee of up to, Euro 762,000 to Ireland with fees fixed at 0.5% of 
turnover.259  High licence fees act as a barrier to market entry in some countries. 
4.2.8 Institutional arrangements 
The Framework Directive focuses particularly on the responsibilities and powers of the NRAs 
since they are the foundation of the new regulatory system.260
The Commission (Directorates General on Competition and Telecommunications monitors the 
implementation of telecommunications liberalisation.261 The European Community stimulates 
research and development in the telecommunications sector to increase the sector's 
competitiveness.  
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), founded in 1988, is now 
responsible for setting common standards, such as for ONP and mobile communications (GSM).  
The European Parliament has attempted to strike a satisfactory balance between the liberalisation 
needed to promote market development and the regulation needed in order to protect consumers 
and has used the co-decision procedure to have its amendments accepted, for example in the 
application of ONP to voice telephony.262  
The European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications and Network Services (ERG), 
composed of the heads of each relevant NRA in the Member State, established to provide an 
                                                 
258 Article 11, Licensing Directive. 
259 Teligen Ltd.; Supra Note 253.p.28,  
260 9th Implementation Report. 
261 Currently the 9th Implementation Report is available. Directorates General IV and XIII deal with 
telecommunications. 
262 European Parliament; Fact sheets of the European Parliament, ‘Telecommunications’, posted at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_7_7_en.htm viewed on 22/07/2004. 
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interface for advising and assisting the Commission, allows co-operation and consultation with 
market operators, consumers and end users 263
International Telecommunications Users’ Group (INTUG) acts as a single voice for 
telecommunications users and its mission is to ensure that users access affordable, interoperable 
services and that their voice is heard and argued for the introduction of competition.  
The Communications Committee has been established under the new framework with a view to 
replace the ONP Committee and the Licensing Committee, which are instituted under the old 
regulatory package.264 The Committee assists the Commission in carrying out its executive powers 
under the new regulatory framework. It exercises its function through advisory and regulatory 
procedures in accordance with the Council Comitology Decision and furthermore provides a 
platform for an exchange of information on market developments and regulatory activities.  
There have been calls for the creation of a European regulatory authority and the question is 
whether the current decentralised system of ONP should be replaced by a centralised European 
telecommunications agency.265 The recommendation for a European Regulatory Authority was 
based on the consideration that some regulatory tasks would be better undertaken at Community 
level. Currently, the practice is to continue with NRAs as the implementing agencies for EU policy. 
The debate continues. 
EU has many regulatory bodies in telecommunications, which requires a lot of co-ordination on 
policy formulation and implementation issues. 
4.2.9 WTO obligations 
EU participates in the WTO as an alliance (European Communities)266. The Council adopted a 
Decision in November 1997 approving the negotiation results on behalf of the European 
Community. The agreement in the form of an additional Telecommunications protocol to GATS 
entered into force with a few restrictions on transition periods for liberalisation in certain Member 
States (consistent with the internal EC liberalisation process) and direct foreign ownership 
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limitations in some Member States (i.e. France and Portugal). The EC and its Member States 
undertook binding regulatory commitments on the basis of the full Reference Paper. From the 
different commitments made, there are considerable variations concerning the conditions that 
operators will find depending on the specific market access commitments undertaken. 
4.3 Observations  
The NRAs have a degree of discretion in implementing regulatory framework and are doing most 
of the implementation work.267 However, there are variations in the structural independence of 
NRAs and the regulatory mandate or responsibility across the EU Member States. These are 
variations that could have a great impact on the market. Diverse outcomes are possible from a 
completely harmonised legal framework due to differences in implementation and discretionary 
powers of NRAs to set conditions.  It is very difficult to see how NRAs can be expected to achieve 
harmonised outcomes if the objectives, approaches and processes they employ are significantly 
different.  
The regulatory regimes in Germany, the Netherlands and UK are usually viewed as relatively pro-
competitive by exerting a lot pressure on incumbents yet the French regulator is biased in favour of 
the state-owned incumbent.268
There is great variation in the effectiveness of national regulatory regimes despite the fact that each 
Member State is supposed to implement a harmonised EU regulatory framework.269 These 
differences may appear negligible but negatively impact the development of the sector as for pan-
European operators, the main barrier to entry and to competitive development is the inconsistency 
of regulations across Europe.270 A study in which the regulator’s general functions271 were 
assessed, revealed that UK and Denmark ranked first or second and Belgium and Germany ranked 
eight or ninth and that investment was higher in UK and Denmark than in the other two Member 
States.272 The report concluded that the levels of total investment in telecommunications vary 
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significantly between Member States and that there is a strong and positive relationship between 
levels of investment and levels of regulatory effectiveness. 
There is a lot of commitment, institutional co-ordination, political effort aimed at developing a 
single market, and research and development activities in the sector, which definitely provides a 
suitable backdrop for the development of the telecommunications sector in a single market. 
Regulatory efficiency has resulted in increased investment in those countries with better 
implementation mechanisms while there has been low investment in those with poor regulation.  
The common policy development from EU towards Member States has led to harmonization, 
which assists in reducing entry barriers. 
The question remains what the Commission or other bodies can do when transposition is done in a 
way that results are contrary to the policy objectives and whether infringement proceedings are 
enough. 
4.3.1 Weaknesses of the EU framework 
The content of the new regulatory framework is to a greater extent adequate but there are 
deficiencies in implementation as Member States take liberties. The framework law remains 
exactly that- just providing directions and then reacting when these are not met. Implementation is 
the issue. 
Reviews have revealed failures to transpose legislation and that a significant part of the adopted 
directives that formed the backbone of legislation on the internal market were not transposed into 
national law, or were badly transposed, in addition to failures in implementation.273 By November 
1 2003 only 8 countries had taken action to incorporate the new regulatory framework into national 
law.274  Acts that had been properly transposed as scheduled were sometimes badly implemented 
by national administrations, either because some of their provisions were overlooked in 
administrative practice, or were differently interpreted from one country to another; moreover 
operators and consumers affected by these failures did not always have access to rapid and 
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effective means of redress.275 While providing this impetus, the Commission also took repressive 
action by stepping up its powers under Article 226 (169) EC Treaty for prosecuting infringements 
by the Member States which were delaying transposition of directives, transposing them 
incorrectly, or implementing them badly. 276
 A main concern is that the aims of the framework could be put at risk if NRAs do not act in a 
timely manner at national level.277 The Commission’s Internal Market Strategy points out that late 
transposition and ineffective enforcement remain a serious problem for the proper functioning of 
the single market. By opening infringement proceedings, the Commission plays a proactive role in 
relation to the new framework in order to achieve maximum legal certainty for market players and 
investors in this highly dynamic sector. 
Competition law acts slowly, one example being a case on international mobile roaming which has 
been open for nearly five years without any resolution.278 Such delays are deterrents to market 
development and investor confidence. 
Notwithstanding the extensive coverage of the licensing issue by the Commission, there is still a 
risk for diverging approaches on the national level-relying too heavily on a decentralised approach 
may detract from the creation of a clear and stable regulatory framework for the 
telecommunications sector.279 In addition, the growing involvement of the competition authority 
raises the issue of inconsistent jurisdiction in the sector, which may create problems for market 
participants in making market decisions, and the Member States are using various methods to avoid 
conflict in jurisdiction.280
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4.4 Comparison between Licensing/ Authorisation Regimes in the EU and EAC 
4.4.1 Licensing Mandate 
There are variations with regard to which body has the mandate to issue licences in the EU while in 
the EAC, the NRA has a broader mandate in issuing licences save for Uganda, where there is 
greater ministerial involvement for the grant of a major licence. This means that for the EAC there 
is more predictability as independent regulators are in control of the licensing decision-making. 
4.4.2 Institutional framework 
The EU market still exhibits barriers to market entry but with a common policy framework, some 
issues are easier to address as compared to EAC that is still developing institutions.  The EU has a 
wider array of institutions involved in implementing different policy aspects than EAC has. The 
EAC is yet to operationalise all relevant institutions. The EU has more consumer representation in 
line with the general EU policy goals. In EAC consumer involvement in market regulation is not 
directly at the forefront, yet consumer concerns help shape sector development. The financial and 
human resource requirements for setting up and maintaining all the required institutions should be 
taken into consideration. The EU has more financial and human resources at its disposal, which 
EAC will struggle to develop at national and regional levels. ICT indicators are also low for EAC 
as compared to the EU. 
EU has a relatively effective competition policy and mechanism already in place, which the EAC is 
yet to develop. Plans are underway to develop a common competition policy. 
4.4.4 Legislative developments  
The EU has enacted many legislative instruments, which are implementable in varying degrees in 
the Member States. Though there are variations in implementation and even blatant failure to 
transpose as required, this is a better way in which the regulatory certainty required for a single 
market can be attained. The EAC is still in the initial stages of developing strategies and 
operationalising the institutional framework for the whole regional integration exercise. Sector-
specific activities are conducted at a slower pace, though the study on harmonisation of a 
Communication Strategy reveals the possibility of having a common regime and eventually a 
single licensing authority. 
The number of Member States (now 25) increases the probability of divergences, which may not be 
the case for the EAC. The EU has many Member States and so attaining a common approach to 
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anything has been challenging which may not be the case for the EAC where the common factors 
among the three Partner States far outweigh the differences.  
The value system and regulatory culture in EU is very favourable for better regulation of the sector. 
Weak governance structures do not form a good basis for sector regulation yet in EAC; a region 
characterised by poverty, a history of bad governance in Uganda281 and corruption in Kenya, 
establishing a favourable framework requires a lot more starting from the basics of democracy and 
promotion of consumer welfare. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The weaknesses of the EU framework illustrate the difficulty in developing and implementing a 
common regime for licensing. The EAC may face the same or more, so safeguards should be 
developed at the onset. The EU remains nationally fragmented but still has the best example to 
offer in the evolution of a single market in telecommunications and despite the weaknesses 
portrayed in the enforcement and implementation of the regulatory framework, it provides the best 
pointers to similar developments in EAC.  The EU example remains a standard that the EAC can 
seek to emulate in order to reap the benefits that the EU has gained in developing a sectoral 
common market. It is important that the necessary adjustments be made to accommodate the 
differences brought about by the prevailing political and socio-economic factors.  Having 
compared what EU has to offer, it is crucial to make recommendations on what the way forward is 
for the development of a common licensing regime in East Africa. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
A review of the licensing regime in EAC and EU has revealed that there are divergences in the 
sector policies, which are likely to negatively affect the development of a single market and that 
EAC can learn from the EU. 
5.1 Recommendations 
In order to chart a way forward, it is important that a harmonised and simplified licensing regime 
for EAC develop with same conditions, procedures, charges, fees, timeframes and categorizations; 
taking into consideration these recommendations. The choice for any regulatory alternative is pre-
conditioned by a number of factors, including not only the general institutional framework and the 
existing structure but also by choices regarding the scope of legislation within and outside the 
sector.282  
Certainty and consistency are necessary to boost investor confidence. The ground rules should be 
clearly defined for the avoidance of doubt. If the final regime is not clearly defined, economic 
players and regulators face an additional uncertainty when taking strategic decisions. Firms cannot 
take adequate investment decisions without knowing whether and when they will be able to enter a 
certain market, which may prevent rapid development of the telecommunications industry.283 The 
re-regulatory decision on the national level requires an active Community telecommunications 
policy if a common market is to be established.284  
A common licensing regime embracing the one-stop-shopping procedure should be adopted since 
EAC is smaller with fewer national interests and limited divergences. This procedure could be 
relevant to the single investment area and with the idea of political federation moving at fast-track, 
this is the way to go. A common licensing platform is desirable. Licences granted should only 
require notification and certification by other states on the basis of mutual recognition. 
Authorisations should be the goal but in the meantime licensing and asymmetrical regulation 
remain relevant as the markets are just opening up, competition regimes not yet mature and NRAs 
have to be in control. In the meantime, a single regulator for the EAC is not feasible now but in the 
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meantime guidelines for national implementation of a common licensing framework are crucial to 
ensure that NRAs do not make optional conditions mandatory and co-ordinated policy 
implementation. Political will, a strong EACJ and a more aggressive EARPTO will be required. 
EAC to be able to achieve full regional integration requires a mature institutional framework 
encompassing political, legal, regulatory and commercial issues that will facilitate the smooth 
operation of a free market and boost investor confidence.285
NRAs discretion while implementing EAC legislation should be closely watched to avoid 
frustration of goal of harmonisation. There is need to ensure balance so that NRAs do not abuse the 
discretionary powers. It is not advisable to distribute the responsibilities of NRAs widely among 
different institutions, such as competition authorities as lack of co-ordination affects the whole 
exercise.286 In EU, NRAs have a certain degree of discretion while implementing EU legislation, 
which culminates in different speeds of effectiveness of liberalisation. Another alternative could be 
comprehensive licensing, which is mandatory to achieve regulatory certainty necessary for investor 
confidence and certainty by specifying rights and obligations of operators, licences provide 
investors and all stakeholders a clear understanding and certainty such as was done in Uganda.287
Divergences should be avoided so that there is a levelled ground for all operators across EAC. A   
model law and guidelines at EAC level could ensure that regulatory objectives are retained to avoid 
the introduction of divergences, which will affect sector regulation at that level. Divergence 
between member states was found to threaten European integration in the telecommunications 
sector.288 Increasing liberalisation and internationalisation of telecommunications services has led 
to increasing calls for supranational regulatory bodies to ensure that a consistent approach is taken 
across regional or global networks.289 Approximation of laws and policies relating to 
telecommunications is a must for the EAC. Approximation entails the adoption of standard setting 
directives at EU level and their compulsory implementation by Member States so as to combat 
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distortions in the single European Market.290 Uganda has to set a time limit for the licensing-
decision making process to boost clarity. 
There will be need for regulatory convergence for a common telecommunications market in East 
Africa. Regulatory convergence describes a process whereby national lawmakers adopt more or 
less similar regulations in order to respond to the challenges of a changing environment.291 
Tanzania will have to embrace the WTO regime for telecommunications and make commitments if 
the single market is to work. Participation in supranational law-making organisations entails the 
compulsory acceptance of norms accepted by those organisations.292 Differing interests at WTO 
level do not augur well for the EAC as a single investment area. 
The sector should be regulated independently at all levels to avoid political capture, which will 
inevitably hinder sector development. Political capture is where regulation is designed and 
promoted to meet the needs of the political elites and to preserve its power- this should be avoided 
in the EAC.293 Ministerial influence should be minimised. A regulatory solution must be found 
which allows the objectives of telecommunications policy to be pursued in an effective manner and 
with adequate legitimacy without undermining on the one hand, the independent regulatory 
capacities of the Partner State or on the other hand, the general process of integration. 294
Competent manpower is crucial for sectoral development and EAC has to invest in manpower 
development. Given the dynamics of the sector, Africa needs to be proactive in developing high 
numbers and quality of skilled manpower to manage the technical, regulatory and other aspects of 
the ever-changing information technology sector.295
Participation of representatives of operators, users, consumers, manufacturers, private sector is 
important as part of a people-driven initiative. The activities of EARPTO and other common 
initiatives should be encouraged, as stakeholder participation is essential. A broad consultation 
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process is essential in consensus building amongst political partners, operators and all market 
participants for any supranational process.296
EAC adopted the principle of subsidiarity and this should be abided with to ensure that country-
relevant approaches are developed but this should not be at the expense of developing a coherent 
framework for the proposed single market. Subsidiarity should be applied rigorously so that an 
appropriate division is found between regulatory issues with an impact on cross-border markets 
(where EU level regulators should have authority) and predominantly national issues for which the 
Member States should have prime responsibility.297 The right balance of responsibility was a pre-
condition for the desirable market structures in the EU to develop and the same applies to EAC. 
The investment regime influences many activities in the region and there is need to harmonise it 
within the Customs Union if a single market is to develop.  
EAC administrations should adopt market-driven, pro-competitive market entry policies so that the 
greatest number of providers can compete in the EAC region. Exclusivity should not continue as 
this sets back competition and its desired goals. The validity of rights that do not affect the interests 
of other undertakings under law could be extended in order to avoid claims on compensation and 
litigation on exclusivity as has been recommended in the EU. Regulation may strongly affect the 
incentive on whether and how to enter a market or market segment as entry decisions depend not 
only on regulation that applies at the moment of entry but also on the expected future regulatory 
policy until infrastructure investments become obsolete or contracts expire.298
The EAC regulatory system should be sector-specific as competition policy and institutions, where 
they exist, may not be able to cope with the challenges of a dynamic telecommunications sector as 
the example of the EU reflects. Competition policy ought to be directed pre-dominantly towards 
removing regulatory barriers to entry.299  
The recommendations made in the preliminary study on a communications strategy reflected in 
greater detail in Annex V ought to be taken into account if the EAC is to develop as a single 
investment area for the telecommunications sector. 
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EAC should seek to de-fragment national markets and aim at a single market for 
telecommunications which is not an easy feat but is possible. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
Effort has been made to analyse the different aspects relating to licensing and market entry in the 
EAC telecommunications sector, and compare with developments in the EU before making 
recommendations. Regional integration is the way to deal with the challenges of globalisation and 
there is no way EAC can compete successfully but as a single market in the telecommunications 
sector. While considering the development of a common market for telecommunications services, 
it is important to ensure that factors in favour of market entry are in place. A common licensing 
framework, a common regulatory and investment regime as well as adequate institutional 
framework will all serve to ensure that EAC can compete favourably in the world market. The 
development of pan-EAC services should be the ultimate goal. 
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ANNEXTURES 
ANNEX I 
 
Conditions of the SNO Licence- Uganda 
 
i. Network roll-out: The SNO licence required both licence bid price and network rollout (the 
SNO was required to provide 89,000 lines in the first 5 years and it adopted a wireless 
approach as it was easier and convenient to meet network rollout requirements. Intervention 
would be limited to monitoring compliance and establishing approaches to service provision 
in un-served areas. The obligations included: universal access facilitation by meeting rollout 
obligations with a lower number of new lines but with a larger proportion of new capacity in 
rural areas and MTN agreed to connect a payphone to all the district and county headquarters 
that had electricity and road access to the site. MTN Publicom was established in 1999 to 
meet the obligation to roll out at least 2000 payphones and by 2001 over 2500 payphones had 
been installed.  
ii. Price control: the licences specify the details of a price-cap type price regulation which is to 
continue while the duopoly on basic services is in effect and no further regulatory decisions 
regarding prices will be made during the 5 years. 
iii. Interconnection: both licensees are required to negotiate interconnection agreements. Pending 
agreement, either licensee can request from the other the immediate application of prices and 
terms. 
iv. Monopolistic prices: licensees cannot unduly condition the provision of telecommunications 
services on purchase of terminal equipment and cross-ownership between both companies is 
not allowed. 
v. Resale: licensees are obligated to provide basic exchange services for resale of public pay 
telephone service. 
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ANNEX II 
EAC Common Telecommunications Projects 
(i). The temporarily suspended East African Digital Transmission US $60m project plan to 
install an optical fibre transmission system linking capital cities and a number of major 
towns in the three countries so as to improve trade relations.  
(ii). The EAC Telecommunications Trunking project for regional telecommunications networks 
(Land Based Trunk Network, East African Submarine Cable Network and Lake Victoria 
backbone Ring Network) targets the private sector as the driving force or some public-
private sector partnership arrangement.  
(iii). Implementation of the Cross-Border Telecommunication Connectivity Project to facilitate 
direct links between border towns in the region and interactions across borders. There is also 
a project to build infrastructure to establish a regional carrier that could lease out services to 
other operators. 
(iv). East African Submarine system (EASSy), - this project involves nine eastern and southern 
African countries that are planning to install a submarine fiber cable off the east African 
coast to lower telecommunication costs in the area. Delegates from leading telecom 
companies in the nine countries signed a memorandum of understanding to develop the 
cable in Kampala, Uganda in June 2004 to consider implementation. The 8,840 km, 200 
million-US dollar project will run from Djibouti through Somalia's Mogadishu, Kenya's 
Mombassa, Tanzania's Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, then through Maputo in Mozambique 
with a link to Mahajanga in Madagascar and to the coastal town of Mtunzini in South 
Africa. The undersea fiber-optic cable project will be completed in 2006.300  
(v). A number of studies have been conducted such as that on the harmonisation of the EAC 
Communications Strategy which found that there are significant variations in the regulatory 
regime of the three East African states in, inter alia, the following areas: privatisation of 
incumbent, independence of regulators; services liberalisation; public VoIP; universal 
service fund; tariff regime; structure of the regulatory bodies; broadcasting; and postal 
                                                 
300 ‘Nine African countries plan to install submarine fiber cable’,  posted at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-
06/26/content_1547830.htm  viewed on 29/06/2004.
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reforms301, which variations in one way or another affect the licensing activities of the 
regulator and subsequently market entry. 
(vi). EARPTO has been established and as a task force to study all matters; technical, legal, 
management and budgetary related to the communications regulation at the regional level 
with a view to establishing the basis for the harmonisation of the Communications Strategy 
in the East African region. 
                                                 
301 EAC Secretariat; Final Report Preliminary Study on Harmonisation of Regional Communications Strategy, Arusha, 
November 2003, p.10 
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ANNEX III 
WTO Rules and Telecommunications Sector Specific Commitments302  
WTO Rules 
These relevant rules are:  
1. Most Favoured Nation treatment- a licensing regime must grant market access to operators 
from a WTO member country on terms no less favourable than the terms applicable to 
operators from any other country;303  
2. Transparency- all laws and rules affecting trade in services must be published such as all 
notification, registration or licensing requirements as well as any other forms of recognition or 
approval needed for foreign services suppliers to do business lawfully in the 
telecommunications market of a country;304 and  
3. Barriers to trade-licensing requirements must not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.305 
Telecommunications Sector Specific Commitments 
KENYA 
Voice telephone services are limited to international home country direct services. Market access is 
restricted to service suppliers operating direct voice communication routes otherwise there are no 
limitations. Resale of excess capacity and international call-back services are not permitted. Until 
2003, there was monopoly on supply of services in Nairobi as well as on supply of international 
gateway facilities services and resale in monopoly areas only with permission of supplier of 
underlying services and facilities. Foreign investment is limited to 30% maximum.  
UGANDA 
The presence of natural persons is unbound except technical personnel unless Ugandans are or 
become available otherwise entry and temporary stay of foreign service suppliers has to be in 
compliance with immigration laws. There is a requirement for company registration.  
International basic voice telephony traffic must be carried through networks of the duopoly major 
licence holders and other pre-existing licence holders according to the terms of those licences. The 
resale of excess capacity is prohibited. Mobile cellular voice and data roaming and paging services 
is allowed but cross-border access is permitted only via network of duopoly major licence operator. 
                                                 
302 Details of Kenya and Uganda’s Telecommunications Sector-Specific Commitments are available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm  
303 GATS Article II 
304 GATS Article III 
305 GATS Article VI 
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 ANNEX IV  
National ICT Policies  
TANZANIA306
The vision is for the accelerated development of an efficient telecommunications network, 
providing a national info-communication infrastructure and access to present day 
telecommunication technologies by all sectors of the economy and all segments of the population, 
including universal access The policy objective is to ensure that telecommunication services are 
provided in a liberalized and competitive manner. The specific objectives are to: design a modern 
architecture of a telecommunications and broadcasting infrastructure covering the whole country, with 
an international gateway of sufficient capacity; promote ownership of computers, TVs, Radio and other 
ICT enabled receiving or user devices; ensure provision of adequate, sustainable and efficient 
telecommunication service in all sectors of the economy; and create a favorable environment for 
private sector participation in building a national ICT infrastructure. The overall target for the sector 
is to achieve a telephone density of 6 telephones per 100 people by 2020. Teledensity in 1997 was 
estimated as 0.32 telephones per 100 inhabitants.  
 
UGANDA 
The telecommunications sector policy aimed at increasing teledensity; improving facilities and 
services; and increasing geographical distribution of services, which points directly at the need for 
more operators or increased investment in the sector. The strategy for achieving the policy 
objectives culminated into the repeal of the UPTC Act; establishment of an independent regulator; 
licensing a SNO and fostering competition in the sector.  
The National ICT Policy sets out strategies of meeting the objective of promoting competition, 
private investment and local participation, which is establishment and maintenance of a licensing 
and regulatory regime that promotes fair competition as well as encouraging joint ventures and 
private investment and these are through the promotion of competition in service delivery by 
licensing of several providers; a fully liberalised market for value added services; specification of 
network rollout obligations in major licences to ensure equitable geographical coverage; regular 
                                                 
306 More details are available at http://www.moct.go.tz/ict/pre-zeroth.pdf  
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monitoring of networks to ensure compliance with licence quality of service requirements and the 
adoption of technology-neutral regulatory policies.307
KENYA  
The overall Government objective for the sector is to optimize its contribution to the development 
of the Kenyan economy as a whole by ensuring the availability of efficient, reliable and affordable 
communication services throughout the country. In the area of telecommunications services for 
instance, it is intended:  
(a) To improve penetration in the rural areas from the present 0.16 lines to 5 lines per 100 people 
by the year 2015.  
(b) To improve service penetration in the urban areas from the present 4 lines to 20 lines per 100 
people by the year 2015.  
Telecommunications and information infrastructures are vital for any country's economic 
productivity, competitiveness and national security. These sectors are experiencing rapid 
technological advances which make it imperative for the Government to maintain an effective and 
dynamic policy environment that will facilitate sustainable development and advancement of 
strategic interests. 
                                                 
307 P. Masambu-CEO Uganda Communications Commission , ‘Uganda’s Regulatory Innovations’, presented at CTO 
Conference on Implementing WSIS Action Plan, Nairobi, Kenya 25-26 March 2004. 
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ANNEX V 
PRELIMINARY STUDY ON HARMONISATION OF REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 
STRATEGY 
This study provides justification for the harmonisation of the regulatory framework for a number of 
reasons namely that:  
• The regulatory environment has changed dramatically in the recent years following 
liberalisation of the communications sector ushering in privatisation and competition. 
• East Africa once had a common communications Act, the EAPTC Act 1967 that provides a 
sound historical basis for harmonisation.308 
• A harmonised communications regulatory environment will enhance co-operation in the EAC 
and will be catalytic in the social and economic integration and possible future political union, 
which the three nations aspire to form. It will bring transparency, ease transborder 
implementation and increase FDI. The licensing of regional links needs to be examined by 
regulators to provide regional licensing or create a regional regulatory body. 
• A harmonised environment will provide a transparent regulatory regime throughout East Africa 
which will boost investment in these countries as investors will not worry as to what surprise 
legislation may be applying next door and will accelerate investment and economic 
development. 
• Global trends point at harmonisation at regional and sub-regional levels to facilitate and 
enhance trade and investment within such economic community. 
• All possible steps should be taken to lower the communications tariffs. 
• More competition should be permitted in the areas where there are no exclusivities applying. 
• Regulators should ensure that the universal service obligation is respected and that there is a 
clear road map to achieve this. 
• A harmonised ICT policy for East Africa and a common strategy for implementation will assist 
in the development of a harmonised regulatory regime. 
• Institutional arrangements should be streamlined with all ICT issues at national level under one 
Ministry. 
• Activities aimed at human resource management and development are a necessity. 
                                                 
308 EAC Secretariat; Final Report Preliminary Study on Harmonisation of Regional Communications Strategy, Arusha, 
November 2003, p. 5 
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ANNEX VI  
Investment Regimes 
KENYA 
Doing business involves lodging an application with the IPC, engaging legal advice, registration of 
the company, submitting documents plus certificate of incorporation to IPC and issuance of an 
Investment Licence, which is a certificate of General Authority. The incentives are generous 
investment and capital allowance; remission for customs and VAT; manufacturing under bond 
status; export processing zones status; double taxation agreements; protection and promotion of 
investment agreements; bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements; liberal rates are allowed 
for depreciation of assets based on value; loss carried forward - business enterprises that suffer 
losses can carry forward such losses to be offset against future taxable profits; duty remission 
facility - material imported for use in manufacture for export or for the production of raw materials 
for use in export oriented manufacture or for the production of duty free items for sale domestically 
are eligible for duty remissions.  
The Foreign Investments Protection Act (FIPA) (Cap 518) guarantees repatriation of capital, after 
tax profits and remittance of dividends and interests accruing from investing in the country. 
TANZANIA  
All Government departments and agencies are required by law to cooperate fully with TIC in 
facilitating investors. TIC is the focal point for potential investors and it is charged with the 
following functions: assist in establishment of enterprises such as incorporation and registration of 
enterprises; obtain necessary licenses, work permits, visas, approvals, facilities or services; sort out 
any administrative barriers confronting both local and foreign investments; promote both foreign 
and local investment activities; secure investment sites and assist investors to establish projects; 
grant investment guarantees and register technology agreements for all investments, which are over 
and above US$ 300,000 and US$ 100,000 for foreign and local investments respectively; and 
provide and disseminate up to date information on existing investment opportunities, and  benefits 
or incentives available to investors. 
UGANDA 
Foreign investors require a minimum investment of 100,000 US Dollars in order to qualify for 
incentives and secure an investment licence and while local investors require a minimum 
investment of 50,000 US Dollars, but local investors can commence business without investment 
licences.  
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Investing in Uganda involves: registration of the company in Uganda; application for investment 
licence; obtaining of secondary clearances; and obtaining investment guarantee if desired from the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
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ANNEX VII 
TABLES  
Table 1: Chronology of Reforms in East Africa 
Event  Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
Adoption of 
telecommunications 
policy 
January 1997 February 1996 N/A 
Enactment of 
communications law 
October 1998 26th September 1997 1993 
Separation of Posts from 
telecommunications 
1st July 1999 February 1998 January 1994 
Establishment of 
regulator 
1st July 1999 August 1998 January 1994 
Privatisation of 
incumbent 
After 2005 July 2000 1997 
Entry of 1st mobile 
operator  
1st July 1999  1994 February 1994 
Licensing of 2nd mobile 
operator 
September 1999 1994 November 1993 
Licensing of 2nd operator 28th January 2000 15th April 1999 1995 
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 Table 2: Comparative Statistics for East Africa: June 2003 
Type of service Kenya  Uganda  Tanzania 
Fixed line operators 1 2 2 
Fixed line subscribers 331,000 60,000 151,000 
Mobile cellular operators 2 3 4 
Mobile cellular 
subscribers 
1,600,000 600,000 647,000 
Internet Service 
Providers 
65 17 23 
Internet Hosts 2,702 293 1478 
Internet Users 500,000 60,000 300,000 
Estimated no. of PCs 175,000 70,000 120,000 
International VSAT 
Network Operators 
1 8 6 
Public Data Network 
Operators 
4 N&A 16 
Source: East African Regulators, ITU-CCK 3rd GSM Pre-bidders Conference, Nairobi 24th June 2003 
 
Table 3: Fixed line telecommunication growth in East Africa between 1995 and 2002 
Year 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 CAGR 
(1995-
2002) 
Kenya  239.6 256.4 266.8 270.3 288.2 304.6 321.5 328.1 3.4% 
Uganda 39.0 42.3 45.9 49.8 54.0 58.6 63.6 69.0 8.5% 
Tanzania 90.3 92.7 106.3 115.6 125.6 136.4 148.1 160.8 8.6% 
East 
Africa 
385.7 401.8 424.0 448.8 472.7 498.0 524.8 553.8 5.3% 
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Table 4: Mobile telecommunication growth in East Africa between 1995 and 2002 
Year 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 CAGR 
(1995-
2001) 
As % of 
total 
(2002) 
June 
2003 
Kenya  2.3 2.8 2.8 10.8 23.8 127.4 600 1325 146% 80 1700 
Uganda 1.7 4.0 5.0 12.5 72.6 188.6 323 450 139% 84 550 
Tanzania 3.5 9.0 20.2 37.9 51.0 180.2 427 637 123% 81 820 
East Africa 7.5 15.8 28.0 61.2 147.4 496.2 950 2412 136% 82 3070 
 
 
Table 5: East Africa ICT Indicators 2003: Year-end 2003 provisional estimates. Updated: 
01.04.2004. 
   Population Main telephone lines Mobile subscribers Internet users 
   000s 000s p. 100 000s p. 100 000s p. 100 
Kenya         31'708             328 1.0          1'591 5.0             500 1.6 
Tanzania         35'313             149 0.4             891 2.5             250 0.7 
Uganda         25'599               61 0.2             776 3.0             125 0.5 
 
Source: Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT), International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/af_ictindicators.html
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Table 6: Measures of Investment in Electronic Communications 2001309
Country  Investment as 
% of GDP 2001 
Investment per 
capita 2001 US 
Dollars 
Investment as 
% of Gross 
Fixed Capital 
Formation 
Telecommunication
s Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
per capita (Euro) 
Belgium 0.26% 58 1.24 45 
Denmark 0.79% 239 3.77 186 
France 0.49% 108 2.43 85 
Germany 0.38% 86 1.90 67 
Ireland 0.43% 115 2.03 90 
Italy 0.49% 92 2.46 72 
Netherlands 0.70% 167 3.20 130 
Spain 0.53% 76 2.11 59 
Sweden 0.56% 133 3.22 104 
UK 0.99% 236 5.82 184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309 European Commission; 9th Implementation Report. 
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Table 7: Licensing in the EU 
Body issuing licence  
R= Independent telecommunications regulator,  
M= Ministry 
Oversight of licence 
requirement 
Country  
Fixed  Mobile   
Austria  R R R 
Belgium M M M 
Denmark -No licence or 
registration is required 
for fixed operators. 
R R 
Finland M M M 
France M M R 
Germany R R R 
Greece M M R 
Ireland R R R 
Italy R R R 
Luxembourg    
Netherlands R (only registration) M R 
Portugal R R R 
Spain    
UK    
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development310  
 
 
                                                 
310 Organisation For Economic co-operation and Development; Directorate For Science, Technology and Industry, 
Committee for Information, Computer And Communications Policy, Working Party on Telecommunication and 
Information Services Policies, ‘Telecommunications Regulations: Institutional Structures and Responsibilities’ May 
2000, posted at  http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1999doc.nsf/LinkTo/DSTI-ICCP-TISP(99)15-FINAL  viewed on 
25/07/2004. 
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